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ABSTRACT
THE PROBLEM OF INTERVENTION
MAY 1999
DAVID M. BARNES. B.A., UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gareth B. Matthews
As evidenced in Bosnia, Iraq, and now more vividly in Kosovo, the threat of force
or sanctions, or even promised aid is not sufficient for resolving conflict or ending
genocide. A military humanitarian intervention might be the only means of ending the
suffering. Yet, we must ask ourselves, “is any intervention ever justified?” Historically,
there are many different examples of intervention: some include outright invasion, while
others involve covert support of one group, or state, over another. However, intervention
does not always require direct application of force, for solely political motives - agencies
often conduct interventions for humanitarian reasons. If such a humanitarian intervention
is justified, then what about it makes it justified? Part of the difficulty of attempting to
justify international intervention is that there is a vague and unusable definition of
“intervention.” Without a workable definition, there can be no basis for agreement on
international laws covering interventions. Furthermore, contradicting legal precedents,
different moral and prudential views, and a general lack of political will exacerbates the
problem of intervention.
vi
Nevertheless, I believe there is a workable definition for “intervention7 ' and there
are specific conditions for identifying an intervention as humanitarian. There also
already exists a legal precedent for justified intervention under international law.
Furthermore, there are ample moral grounds to argue for intervention - whether one
believes an act morally right based on moral maxims or purely as a result of their
consequences, one can make a moral argument for intervention. The question left to be
answered is, “Is the intervention justified?” Using the Just War tenets, modified for
intervention, provides the necessary conditions to answer the justification question. We
can no longer stand idle while others suffer their inhuman fates. As Amir Pasic and
Thomas G. Weiss wrote, “The moral barriers between ‘us' and ‘them 7 dissolve as we
encounter naked humanity and are exposed to misery that is no longer mediated by
special differences and distance.” 1 If an intervention is within legal bounds, morally
obligatory, and further justified under Just Intervention tenets, then we, as the
international community, should intervene.
1 Amir Pasic and Thomas G. Weiss, “Y ugoslavia s Wars and the Humanitarian
Impulse.” Ethics and International Affairs 11 (1997): 123.
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CHAPTER 1
THE PROBLEM OF INTERVENTION
How should ye not fight for the cause of Allah and of the feeble among
men and of women and of children who are crying! Our Lord! Bring us
forth from out this town of which the people are oppressors! Oh, give us
from Thy presence some protecting friend! Oh, give us from thy presence
some defender!
- Quaran 1
Introduction
“Belgrade Steps Up Offensive in Kosovo and at Peace Talks,”2 reads one of the
recent headlines. Increasingly, the world seems to be becoming embroiled in the conflict
in Kosovo. Seventeen days of peace talks were ineffective, which only postponed further
discussions another three weeks. Since Serbian President Milosovic announced in a 1987
speech that Serbs living in the formerly autonomous province of Kosovo (Kosovo has
been an autonomous province in Yugoslavia since 1945) should “claim it as their own
land,” there has been fighting between the Serbian military and police forces and Kosovo
rebels (the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA). The KLA demands independence, while the
Serbs want to incorporate Kosovo into a “greater Yugoslavia.” As with any conflict, the
imiocent people of Kosovo are caught in the middle of the conflict. More than two
thousand civilians have been killed and tens of thousands have been forced from their
homes by the fighting. After the massacres in Bosnia, several members of the
international community were quick to denounce the new outbreak of fighting. They
quickly prepared an international intervention to keep the peace in Kosovo and to prevent
the genocide that occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, with Serb forces
continuing to ignore international demands to end the fighting, failing to withdraw their
forces, and effectively blockading a 28,000 strong NATO implementation force into
Kosovo, the planned peacekeeping intervention will have to wait. Intervention in Kosovo
and Serbia by NATO air strikes, as well as other possible uses of force, seems the only
way to force both sides back to the negotiation table. 3
The major question is, “Is this intervention justified?” Although many might
intuitively say that intervention to prevent “ethnic cleansing” is just, not everyone would
agree. Russia has repeatedly denounced the use of force to bring the Serbs to diplomatic
talks. Furthermore, there are two different interventions planned for Kosovo. One
involves air strikes to force a diplomatic solution, while the other involves the use of
international peacekeeping soldiers to separate the belligerents. While they are
interrelated in the overall solution in Kosovo, each intervention has its own ends,
methods, and intentions. Thus, the question concerning the justification of the
intervention is more complicated than it first appears.
Historically, there are many different examples of intervention. Some
interventions include outright invasion, while others involve covert support of one group,
or state, over another. However, intervention does not always require direct application
of force for solely political motives — groups often conduct interventions for humanitarian
reasons. Some of these humanitarian interventions include delivering food to remote
areas, aiding victims of natural disasters, and providing medical attention to victims of
war, as well as forced separation of belligerents inherent in peace enforcement.
Regardless of the intent of the intervention, inherent in every intervention is the violation
2
of another state's right to sovereignty. Interventions, by their nature, are interferences in
the lives and government of a state.
The planned interventions into Kosovo have stated humanitarian intentions — both
are intended to stop the fighting and prevent “ethnic cleansing.” Yet, is any intervention
ever justified? If so, then what makes it justified? Perhaps, success defines a justified
intervention; outcomes of interventions can be both positive and negative. There have
been six (one was planned but not executed) UN sanctioned interventions in the period
from 1990 to 1996. 4 All had humanitarian intents and objectives. Further, each involved
international military forces. These six interventions have had various levels of success.
Not all were completely successful, and some are still ongoing today. Yet, these
interventions are commonly considered justified. Therefore, success alone is not
sufficient to justify interventions.
Multi-Faceted Problem
The problem of international humanitarian intervention is multi-faceted. Like
examining each facet of a gemstone, analyzing what, if anything, justifies intervention
reveals several dilemmas. As I mentioned earlier, intervention entails a violation of
another state's sovereignty. However, allowing an absolutist view of sovereignty is too
restrictive. Putting genocide and mass destruction of life and property behind a veil of
sovereignty would be, as one writer put it, “so flagrantly contrary to humanity that one
could hardly know where to begin discussing it"
However, the issue of sovereignty is not the only area of disagreement. It might
be argued that international law has no authority over interventions. Furthermore, any
3
legal argument for intervention must overcome a long precedent of non-intervention,
which has evolved from the writings of early seventeenth century, international jurists.
Additionally, moral debate ranges over different ways ofjustifying intervention. Some
say that the international community has a duty to intervene to protect universal human
rights. Deontologists could argue that protecting human rights through intervention is a
duty based on the moral principle of respect for all individuals. Yet, others outright deny
the existence of these rights.
Consequentialists deny that there is a moral principle that presupposes the moral
rightness of an act - they are concerned only with consequences of acts. However, some
consequentialist might argue that an intervention is morally right because the intervention
has the best consequences. For example, a consequentialist could argue that an
intervention maximizes hedonic utility. Regardless of the argument, a pro-intervention
consequentialist must address the many unseen consequences involved in an international
intervention. Furthermore, what if we discover that it is our duty to intervene
everywhere? Can we be over-committed? “Demands made by the international
community were only honored when tied to effective uses of military force.
6 Can any
state afford to intervene in every justified case? Some philosophers (e.g. Teson) are
“endeavoring to reorient the established conception of international law, returning more
to the position adopted by Grotius. whereby intervention is always permitted, provided
that the cause is just.”
7
I disagree. I think that only certain interventions are permitted,
and only some of those permitted are obligatory.
Nevertheless, these questions must be tempered by the fact that many political
realists do not think there is an international community and believe there is no
4
international morality. Obviously, any argument for intervention must show otherwise.
However, even if there were sound and valid arguments for intervention, there seems to
be no agreeable system to justify intervention. Each of us has an intuition about the
justification of an intervention, but there is no accepted objective set of criteria that just
interventions must fulfil. Emotionally, I am revolted by genocide and widespread
suffering, which leads me to believe that certain interventions are justified. Thus, my
project is to find some criteria for justifying interventions.
The Project
To justify any intervention. I must first fully analyze the multi-faceted problem of
intervention. From this analysis, I can construct arguments for intervention and outline
the major objections to intervention. The question ofjustifiable intervention is too large
to adequately address every facet here. Therefore, I will limit my focus to defining
military humanitarian intervention, locating a legal precedent for intervention, providing
a deontological argument and a consequential argument for intervention, and finally,
formulating a framework for justifying intervention.
In order to provide arguments for intervention, and eventually provide a
framework to justify certain interventions, I first need to define “intervention." Further,
regardless of its humanitarian intentions and outcomes, I must determine which, if any,
interventions are sanctioned by international law? Are NATO’s planned interventions in
8
accordance with international law? Some might argue that there is no international law.
However, whether or not an intervention is legal under international law, finding a legal
precedent for intervention starts with discovering a functioning definition of
“intervention.”
5
Chapter 2 serves two purposes by defining “intervention” and finding a legal
precedent for intervention. In this chapter, I first review several different interpretations
of what constitutes intervention and determine what (if anything) qualifies as an
international military intervention. Next, I focus on some proposals for what conditions a
humanitarian intervention must satisfy. I then refine the definition of “intervention” that
I will use throughout my analysis ofjustified intervention. At the end of this chapter, I
also show an emerging legal precedent for intervention, in particular humanitarian
intervention, based on a legal tradition to uphold the rights of people, the establishment of
the United Nations (UN), and the development of international laws protecting human
rights.
I propose that if there are human rights, then not only are some interventions
legal, but we have corresponding duties to intervene vis-a-vis these rights.
9
Thus in
Chapter 3, 1 focus on deontological arguments to intervene based on how some cases of
massive human rights violations violate certain universal principles and how the agency
becomes obligated. 10 In this chapter, I outline two ways that these corresponding duties
arise from human rights. The first theory comprises certain primafacie duties generated
by human rights. The second theory describes how duties arise from moral principles
developed from a Kantian/Rawlsian view. Next, I use the analogy of the Good Samaritan
to show how violations of human rights might impose obligations of intervention.
Further, I discuss several notions of how the duties and rights of the agency (intervener)
and the target (intervenee) are related. I show that some duties of the victims pass on to
others, opening the way for intervention. Additionally, I discuss H.L.A. Hart s
distinctions between general and specific duties, and present a specific torm ol Guardian
6
Relationship that might address how the international community acquires the duty to
intervene.
Also in Chapter 3, 1 discuss how political realists such as Niebuhr, Morgenthau.
and Kennan propose that international intervention could never be a duty. 1
1
Realists
believe that there is no such thing as an international morality because there is no
international society. Thus, for a realist, the decision to intervene or not, while politically
important, is morally irrelevant. Disagreeing with these realist beliefs, I show that
international interdependence has transformed a world of separate states into an informal
“international community.” In addition, I discuss how intervention might be to a realist’s
advantage because it leads to politically desirable results of increased stability and
international credibility.
During my search to justify intervention. I have discovered little consequentialist
discussion regarding intervention. It would be unfair to report that recent literature has
ignored the various consequences of intervention. Rather, these discussions have focused
on theories that, for example, conclude that intervention is a morally right action or that
failing to stop “ethnic cleansing” and genocide is morally wrong based on accepting or
violating certain moral laws. However, the obligation to intervene need not be entirely a
question of moral law. In Chapter 4, 1 discuss an argument that the international
community may have an obligation to intervene based solely on the consequences (or
1
resulting state of affairs).
To show that intervention could be consequentially obligatory, I first outline a
consequentialist theory involving possible worlds. Next, I describe how to evaluate the
consequences of intervention using this theory. Then, I discuss some examples to
7
demonstrate how an intervention would be obligatory. Additionally, I address some
potential shortcomings of a consequentialist view, including an objection of potential
unforeseen consequences and the problem of providing continuing aid.
I also discuss why the following often heard objection is invalid.
If one ought to intervene in country A, one ought to intervene in country
B, C, D, E, .... It would be impossible to intervene in A, B, C, D, E ....
One only ought to do what one can do. (“Ought” presupposes “can.”)
Therefore, one ought not to intervene in country A.
lj
Intervention in A does not entail intervention in B. C, D, E, .... Furthermore, not every
situation warrants an intervention. Some interventions are obligatory while others are
not. In Chapter 4, whether an intervention is obligatory is based on the consequences of
that intervention. Accordingly, some interventions will have “better” consequences than
others. By using a consequentialist theory, we can avoid some of the problems of a
deontological argument (e.g. some minor human rights violations obligating numerous
costly interventions) and we can certify when an intervention is obligatory.
Chapter 5 outlines a framework for justifying intervention, and discusses the
problem of sovereignty. Instead of inventing some new criteria of intervention, I propose
modifying the tenets of the Just War (bellumjustum) Tradition to justify intervention.
Using the Just War Tradition has several important advantages over creating a new
framework: its use is historically documented, socially and theologically acceptable, and
it has been successful in justifying other sovereignty infringements. The tenets of the
Just War Tradition provide a framework where the international community can
determine when a state has forfeited its right to sovereignty and when international forces
8
can conduct a humanitarian intervention. By justifying their actions through the Just War
Tradition, the international community can selectively intervene in other states.
To show that the bellumjustum tenets provide justification for intervention, I
begin with a brief explanation of the Just War Tradition, including both the conditions for
deciding to wage war (jus ad bellum ) and the conditions for the conduct of war (Jus in
bello). Next, I examine each tenet and demonstrate how the Just War Tradition,
specifically the conditions forjus ad bellum
,
can be applied to intervention. Furthermore,
I show that the tenets that govern conduct in war (jus in bello) also applies to intervening
forces. Throughout this chapter, I discuss some objections that have been raised against
the Just War Tradition tenets, in addition to some objections that opponents of
intervention might raise in opposition to using the Just War Tradition as a framework for
intervention. Specifically, I address the limitations of the UN as a legitimate authority.
Finally, I discuss the objection regarding intervention as a violation of sovereignty and
show how states sometimes forfeit this right. I do not propose eliminating the right to
sovereignty because I feel it is fundamental for normal international interaction.
However, gross rights violations, massacres, and an inability to provide assistance to
one’s own population reduces the absolute right of sovereignty. The refusal or inability
of states to assist their populous legally and morally opens their borders to intervention.
Conclusion
Since World War II, the international community has witnessed large amounts of
human suffering. Hitler’s plan to systematically erase all memory of the European
Jewish population has been repeated on numerous occasions in nearly every comer of the
world. Cambodia, Rwanda, Uganda, Angola. Bosnia - the countries are different but the
9
suffering remains the same. Instead of travel posters of exotic places full of life and
beauty, we see pictures of human depredation and read headlines about murder and
genocide. Sadly, economic aid, sanctions, and threatened air strikes have done little to
mediate the conflicts around the world. Furthermore, it is possible that international
inaction is a result of our inability to justify certain interventions.
The international community professed interests and actions beyond their
real willingness to intervene in the former Yugoslavia, which gave hope to
the victims of aggression that the West would eventually come to their
aid.. . . Moreover, symbolic use of military force only highlights the limits
of community interest . 14
As evidenced in Bosnia, Iraq, and now Kosovo, the threat of force or sanctions, or even
promised aid is not sufficient for resolving conflict and ending genocide. Intervention
might be the only means of ending the suffering. Nevertheless, part of the difficulty that
prevents international intervention is a vague and unusable definition of “intervention.”
Without such a workable definition, there can be no basis for agreement on international
laws covering interventions.
I believe there is a workable definition for “intervention” and that there already
exists a legal precedent for justified intervention under international law. Further,
whether one believes an act morally right based on moral maxims or purely as a result of
their consequences, one can make a moral argument for intervention. The question left to
be answered is, “Is the intervention justified?” Using the Just War tenets, modified for
intervention, provides the necessary conditions to answer the justification question. We
can no longer stand idle while others suffer their inhuman fates. The moral barriers
between *us’ and ‘them’ dissolve as we encounter naked humanity and are exposed to
10
misery that is no longer mediated by special differences and distance .” 15 If an
intervention is within legal bounds, morally obligatory, and further justified under Just
Intervention tenets, then we, as the international community, should intervene.
11
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CHAPTER 2
WHAT IS INTERVENTION?
Introduction
In the former East Pakistan of the 1970's, Pakistani government soldiers were
involved in the torture, rape, and killing of thousands of Bengali. Furthermore, the
oppression and killings were not random acts of violence; Pakistani officers used lists of
political, cultural, and intellectual leaders to hunt down and eliminate any potential
opposition. Faced with hunger, persecution, and massacre, millions of Bengali people
were forced to chose the uncertainty of an unknown future and fled their homelands -
flooding the borders of India. The region was sliding into chaos. The Bengali cause was
brought before the United Nations (UN), but no action was taken. Diplomacy also failed
as talks between India, Pakistan, and the Bengali rebels stagnated. Faced with millions of
refugees and a crisis that could de-stabilize the region, India invaded in December 1 97 1
.
1
The invasion of East Pakistan by India is a clear example of a justified
intervention. Historically, however, intervention has not always been so clear and easy to
identify. There are many faces to intervention. The Argentinean invasion of the Falkland
Islands during 1982, the civil war in El Salvador from 1979 to 1990, the Gulf War during
1991, the August 2, 1914, German invasion of Luxembourg, the Vietnam War (1965-75),
and the UN deployment to Angola (1989-1995) all have something in common - they are
all examples of international military intervention of one type or another.
While each of these interventions involved the use of force by one state
penetrating the boundaries of another state, each of these examples is different from the
14
others in intent and method as well as in scope. Some, like the UN Angola Verification
Mission (UNAVEM III), were plainly intended for humanitarian purposes. UNAVEM
III involved the deployment of 7,000 soldiers from eight states into Angola to monitor the
cease-fire and oversee the peace process. 2 Other interventions had less benevolent
intentions. Many interventions were intended to regain lost territory (the Falkland
Islands war), establish forward staging areas for further invasion (1914 German invasion
of Luxembourg), or to prevent the spread of another adversarial government (the
Vietnam War and the major super-powers’ involvement in the civil war in El Salvador).
Some invasion-like interventions have obvious political or military motives, while the
motives of others (for example the super-power strategic struggle of the Cold War played
out in the Third World) were not so obvious.
Historically, we tend to combine all international military actions into the
category7 of intervention, whether they are motivated by humanitarian or political reasons.
With so many different types of military actions occurring around the world, it is
sometimes difficult to identify what exactly constitutes intervention per se. Additionally,
since my project is to identify a process to justify certain interventions, which (if any)
interventions might be justified? How can we tell? Are there certain conditions that
military action must satisfy to qualify as a specific type of intervention?
Once we identify what constitutes an intervention, adding the condition of
identifying a humanitarian intent further complicates the task of defining intervention.
Humanitarian intentions might range from assisting in medicinal distribution, to
protecting human rights, and to (as some may suggest) the pursuit of human-rights
violators. While states often use humanitarian intentions as an excuse to mask other,
15
perhaps self-serving reasons3
,
the Indian invasion of East Pakistan is a good example of
one state intervening in another primarily to stop human rights violations. The invasion
lasted only two weeks, lending further credence to India’s claim that the intervention was
intended only for humanitarian objectives. India quickly defeated the Pakistani forces,
ended the killings, and withdrew back across her border.
In order to provide some arguments for humanitarian military intervention and
eventually provide a framework to justify certain interventions, we first need to define
intervention. Further, regardless of its humanitarian intentions and outcomes, we must
determine which, if any, interventions are sanctioned by international law. Was India’s
intervention in accordance with international law? Some might argue (as Niebuhr,
Morganthau, and Kennan would have) that international intervention is never legal .4
Regardless of whether or not an intervention can occur within the framework of
international law, finding a legal precedent for intervention starts with discovering a
working definition of “intervention.”
This chapter is divided into two parts - defining “intervention” and the conditions
of humanitarian intervention, and finding a legal precedent for intervention. First, I will
review the various definitions of “intervention” to determine what qualifies as an
international, military intervention. I will then refine the definition of “intervention” that
I will use throughout my analysis of the problem ofjustified intervention. Additionally, I
will analyze various proposals for what conditions constitute humanitarian intervention. I
will also discuss the use of soldiers in humanitarian interventions, including the use of
force. Armed with this definition of “intervention " and the criteria for humanitarian
16
intervention, I will also show an emerging legal precedent for intervention and in
particular humanitarian interventions.
Defining “Intervention”
Part of the troublesome task ofjustifying intervention — in particular humanitarian
intervention - arises from differing definitions of “intervention.” The problem of
defining “intervention” is exacerbated because (in general) intervention can occur at
several levels. Intervention can occur between individuals, between a state (or group,
organization, etc.) and individuals, and between states. One definition of “intervention”
might rely upon how one might view the rights of an individual verses the rights of states.
Additionally, there are differing views as to how these individual and collective rights (if
they exist) interact. However, for the purposes of this project, I will focus on
interventions between states. Disagreement on what constitutes intervention has
uncovered the additional problem of finding non-tendentious conditions for what
constitutes a justified intervention.
In order to define “intervention.” I will start with some common notions of
intervention. There are several readily available definitions of “intervention." The
American Heritage Dictionary defines intervene as, “to come in or between so as to
hinder or to modify,” or “to interfere, usually through force or threat of force, in the
affairs of another nation." The dictionary defines intervention as, “the policy or practice
of intervening in the affairs of another sovereign state.”" According to these definitions,
the interventions mentioned in the last section (El Salvador, Falklands, Luxembourg, etc.)
are all interventions. Thus, from these definitions we can derive some common traits of
intervention. Interventions have states (or groups) that are interveners and states (or
17
groups) in whose affairs others forcibly interfere. For consistency with intervention
literature, and following terminology proffered by John Vincent, I shall call the former
agency and the later the target ,6 Raymond Plant seems to concur with the dictionary
definition. He writes, “[intervention is] an action, or inaction, or failure to complete
previous actions with the intention of influencing the domestic policy of a particular
state .”
7
Another dictionary, the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary , offers a
longer definition - which seems more precise.
Intervene - to interfere usu. by force or threat of force in another nation's
domestic affairs in order to protect the lives or property of the nationals of
the interfering nation or to further some other purpose deemed vital to its
welfare .
8
From Webster's definition, we might expand the conditions of intervention. Besides the
agency and the target, we must consider the method of intervention; two examples of the
method are coercion through the actual direct use of force and coercion by a show of
force. (The quantity of this method of intervention would be the force level). In the
aforementioned intervention examples at the beginning of this chapter, the method of
intervention always included the deployment and use of military forces. Recent
examples of show of force interventions include the oil embargo of Iraq and the threat of
NATO air strikes to stop Serbian advance in Kosovo (Operation Deliberate Falcon).
Furthermore, Webster’s definition introduces the idea of intent, or purpose, for
intervention. Here, according to Webster s there are only two purposes: to protect
nationals or to protect some deemed vital interests. Interventions in El Salvador, the
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Falklands, Luxembourg, and the Gulf War had the common purpose of protecting
supposed vital interests within the country or region of the intervention. There are many
other historical examples of intervention to protect some interest or to gain further
influence. Some such interventions involved the right of self-protection (or self-defense),
while others involved an attempt to influence international prestige. For example,
"traditionally, arms aid has been used by states to build up allies and substitute arms for
the use of one's own forces, to influence the balance of power in an area of the world
where important interests were involved....’'9 The theory that an intervention’s purpose
is to protect state interest is not a twentieth century development. Even in the nineteenth
century, "after the Napoleonic wars, ... Austria, Prussia and Russia ... wanted to
establish a general right of intervention into any revolutionary situation.” 10
Thus far we have uncovered several common features of intervention: agency,
target, method, and purpose. Therefore, to proceed to what constitutes intervention, I will
define “intervention,” INT, as follows:
INT =df an agency interference, by force or show of force, into the affairs
of a target to i) protect the agency’s nationals or ii) protect interests
considered vital to the agency.
Political theorists Hare and Joynt would agree with this definition, INT. They might
further conjecture that an intervention that meets the definition, INT, would be justified.
They write, “in short, there is a justified right of intervention only if some other country
acts to impose or depose governments by force or by subversion and if the evidence for
such interventions is clear."
1
1
Yet, Hare and Joynt’ s conclusion, that when an
intervention meets the criteria of INT it is justified, may be premature. If INT alone
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justifies interventions, many interventions that intuitively seemed unjustified (such as the
German invasion into Luxembourg) would now be justified.
INT seems incomplete. Other theorists have offered other purposes for
intervention. Two other purposes for intervention frequently mentioned are supporting a
succession and counter-intervention. Mill, although a supporter of non-intervention.
proposed these conditions for intervention. He allowed intervention “where a political
community within existing state borders is struggling for independence” (secession or
national liberation), and “where a foreign power has already intervened” (counter-
• * 12 *
intervention). ~ An instance of interv ention on behalf of succession occurred as France
blockaded the British fleet and provided other assistance during the American
Revolutionary War.
Examples of counter-intervention, however, are harder to locate. Although
counter-intervention can be viewed as merely intervening into a target because the
agency's opposition has already intervened, cases of actual counter-intervention are rare.
Where does one side’s intervention end and another’s begin? Some might argue that
historical examples of counter-intervention include China's entering the Korean War, El
Salvador’s civil war, and the involvement of the United States in Vietnam. In these
examples, one agency counter-intervened to stop the intervention of a different,
competing agency.
However, assuming counter-intervention is a valid purpose of intervention, it
seems that INT needs modification to include the additional purposes of intervening
during succession and of counter-intervention. Thus, INT becomes
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INT' =df an agency interference, by force or show offeree, into the affairs
of a target i) to protect the agency’s nationals, ii) to protect interests
considered vital to the agency, iii) to support succession, or iv) for
counter-intervention.
The correctness of INT seems to be confirmed when one checks current literature
on intervention. In Richard Little’s review of the intervention literature, he suggests that
the purposes for intervention include: (1) the -’inherent right of self-defense as enshrined
in the UN Charter," (2) counter-intervention, where “it is presupposed that if the state has
gone to the support of a party in a domestic dispute within another state, then the way is
opened for a second state to intervene legitimately by supplying assistance to the opposite
side of the dispute’’, or (3) “in order to protect its own citizens.”
lj
It seems as though we have uncovered the elusive definition of “intervention,”
INT'. However, since the purpose is also to determine what constitutes a humanitarian
intervention, not merely intervention in general, we must review the conditions that must
be satisfied to make an intervention count as humanitarian. Obviously, not all of the
examples of intervention I have discussed up to this point have a humanitarian method.
Nor, do many of them seem to have an overt humanitarian purpose. Thus, in the next
section. I will attempt to locate and discuss the conditions for humanitarian intervention.
A Humanitarian Intervention
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse have identified several humanitarian criterion that
an intervention must satisfy to be declared “humanitarian." They include: (a) a
humanitarian cause, (b) a declared humanitarian end. (c) that the agency worked
impartiality towards this end (a humanitarian approach), (d) a humanitarian means, and
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(e) a humanitarian outcome . 14 The Ramsbotham and Woodhouse conditions provide a
good initial framework to discuss and define humanitarian intervention.
The foremost requirement for any interv ention to be classified as humanitarian is
that it must have a humanitarian cause or purpose. The purpose outlines what the agency
hopes to accomplish by intervening and answers the question of “Why intervene?” Only
when an agency’s intentions include purposes such as stopping genocide, feeding
refugees, providing medicine, or ending the fighting can the intervention be declared
humanitarian. Furthermore, without some humanitarian purpose, interventions that result
in the protection of human rights are only accidentally humanitarian. Worse, human
rights violations that are inadvertently thwarted by the crackdown of an oppressive victor
might mistakenly be labeled as humanitarian. Thus, humanitarian intervention must have
a humanitarian purpose. Intervening with a humanitarian purpose specifies the
justification for the humanitarian intervention and helps to focus the agency on the tasks
that they must accomplish by clarifying the reasons for the intervention.
Another technique for focussing the efforts of the intervening agency and its
deployed forces is actually to declare a humanitarian end. The end differs from the
purpose because the end establishes the concrete objectives the agency will meet. The
end forecasts “what things will look like” when the intervention is complete. Declaring a
humanitarian end places a mark on the wall, encouraging all members of the agency to
ensure that each sub-task of the intervention meets with the specified humanitarian
purpose and that the total effort leads to the announced humanitarian end. Furthermore,
declaring the humanitarian end assists the agency to gamer public and international
support for the intervention by proclaiming the intended results.
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Besides a humanitarian purpose and end. humanitarian interventions must be
accomplished through humanitarian means. To do less would detract from the
humanitarian purpose and possibly tarnish the accomplishments of the humanitarian end.
The humanitarian end may be altered or diminished; or worse, the end might be
completely undermined by not enforcing humanitarian means. Using humanitarian
means is analogous to following the tenets of proportionality and discrimination under
the theory ofjus in bello (which I will discuss later in Chapter 5). As some individuals
(i.e. O'Brien) have suggested, conduct during the fighting affects the justification of
war.
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Similarly, only through humanitarian means can one be justified in claiming that
an intervention is or was humanitarian.
A further condition of humanitarian intervention that Ramsbotham and
Woodhouse apply is that the agency must work towards the humanitarian end with
impartiality. They call this condition a humanitarian approach. A good example of an
agency that follows the humanitarian approach is the Medecins Sans Frontieres. The
Medecins Sans Frontieres is an international organization who, in 1993-4, had a budget
of $187 million and employed over 2,000 expatriate personnel working in sixty-three
countries practicing and distributing medicine. Founded by two doctors in 1971,
Medecins Sans Frontieres provides medical services and medicine in conflict-ridden
regions to any state affected by the conflict regardless of affiliation or governmental
consent.
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One must say, however, that the requirement of a humanitarian approach
(impartiality) is rarely satisfied. In the no-fly zone over northern and southern Iraq,
NATO air forces have set aside their impartiality in an attempt to protect the human
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rights of the Kurds of northern Iraq and the Shiites of southern Iraq. In other
interventions, partiality is unavoidable. In Bosnia, all sides have violated the human
rights of one another within the different ethnic and national boundaries. However, the
Serbian forces (the strongest in the region) have been accused of the majority of the
human rights violations. In order to end the violence in the region of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, NATO conducted air strikes against Serbian heavy weapons and
ammunition positions to reinforce the Serbian delegation's commitment to a diplomatic
cease-fire. Abandoning the criteria of impartiality might be considered rash. Certainly, it
would be ideal to perform all humanitarian interventions with impartiality. However, in
order to end the human rights violations in Bosnia-Herzegovina it was necessary' to act
against the stronger state. Being impartial in distributing aid does not entail being
impartial in applying force to end a conflict. Requiring agencies to be impartial might
inhibit the rapid cessation of hostilities. For this reason, I will not include the trait of a
humanitarian approach as a condition of humanitarian intervention.
The success of a humanitarian intervention is determined by whether the outcome
is humanitarian. Right intentions and the right means alone will not ensure a successful
outcome to the intervention operation. Additionally, declaring a humanitarian end is
insufficient without fulfilling that end. All the hard work, countless hours of planning
and labor, and likely loss of life will not be in vain if the agency reaches their stated end
and the outcome is a humanitarian one. However, no matter how humanitarian the
motives of the peacekeeping forces and the international community are, they might still
be blamed for their lack of effort if the outcome is not humanitarian. The end may not
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justify the means,” but the international community judges a successful humanitarian
intervention by the actual outcome.
In summary, the conditions for declaring an intervention as humanitarian include
(a) humanitarian purpose, (b) declared humanitarian end, (c) humanitarian means, and (d)
humanitarian outcome. 1 One could summarize these humanitarian conditions into
another purpose for the definition of “intervention.” Adding a fifth possible humanitarian
purpose to INT' yields
INT"
=df an agency interference, by force or coercion, into the affairs of a
target (i) to protect the agency’s nationals, (ii) to protect interests
considered vital to the agency, (iii) to support succession, (iv) for counter-
intervention, or (v) to prevent or to put a halt to serious violations of
human rights.
Applying the Ramsbotham and Woodhouse humanitarian conditions to the definition of
“intervention.” INT", results in the following formulation of a humanitarian-type
intervention.
An intervention is humanitarian (INTh) iff
.
(1) it is an agency interference, by force or coercion, into the
affairs of a target (i) to protect the agency’s nationals, (ii) to protect
interests considered vital to the agency, (iii) to support succession, (iv) for
counter-intervention, or (v) to prevent or to put a halt to serious violations
of human rights; and
(2) this interference has (a) a humanitarian cause, (b) a declared
humanitarian end, (c) a humanitarian outcome, and (d) is conducted
through humanitarian means.
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Other theorists propose conditions for humanitarian intervention similar in
content to INTh . Mill not only allowed intervention “where a political community within
existing states borders is struggling for independence’' or “where a foreign power has
already intervened." he also foreshadowed the contemporary notion of a humanitarian
intervention. He felt that intervention into a “protracted civil war in which there seemed
to be no prospect of a restoration to order” 18 was allowed to stabilize the region.
Although not necessarily a humanitarian cause, Mill’s proposed interventions into civil
wars would result in the cessation of hostilities (a humanitarian outcome).
The Encyclopedia of War and Ethics defines “humanitarian intervention” as.
“assistance provided to people within a nation by outsiders without the consent of the
national government.”
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Yet, is any consent required? Who can authorize humanitarian
interventions? Theories of humanitarian intervention differ on who can authorize the
intervention. Some philosophers, such as Tan. might argue that there does not need to be
an intervening authority because there is a “primafacie moral obligation to ensure the
effective exercise of [human] rights.” Verwey writes that humanitarian intervention is
The threat or use of force by a state or states abroad, for the sole purpose
of preventing or putting a halt to a serious violation of fundamental human
rights, in particular the right to life of persons, regardless of their
nationality, such protecting taking place neither upon authorization by
relevant organs ofthe United Nations nor with the permission by the
2
1
legitimate government of the target state. [My emphasis]."
Ramsbotham also leaves a requirement concerning the intervening authority out of his
formulation of what constitutes humanitarian intervention. His third characteristic of
humanitarian intervention is that it “took the form of self-help by states (in strict readings
26
collective action by the UN Security Council was not intervention).”22 Lack of an
intervening authority does not alter the definition of “intervention;” however, it may
hinder or even preclude justifying certain incidents of humanitarian intervention where
the purpose or means was controversial. Additionally, apart from self-regulation and
international peer pressure, only a body of the intervening authority can ensure that the
declared end and the means of intervention are indeed humanitarian. I will leave a
lengthy discussion of the legitimate authority for intervention for Chapter 5. For now, I
will assume that humanitarian intervention must have some internationally recognized
authority.
Definition of Intervention and Humanitarian Intervention
Currently the only international body of recognized authority that could fulfil the
role of an internationally recognized authority, where each state is a voting member, is
the United Nations. Adding a clause that includes an intervening authority such as the
United Nations further modifies INTh. Humanitarian intervention now becomes
An intervention is humanitarian (INTh) iff
(1) it is an agency interference, by force or coercion, into the
affairs of a target (i) to protect the agency’s nationals, (ii) to protect
interests considered vital to the agency, (iii) to support succession, (iv) for
counter-intervention, or (v) to prevent or to put a halt to serious violations
of human rights; and
(2) this interference has (a) a humanitarian cause, (b) a declared
humanitarian end, (c) a humanitarian outcome, and (d) is conducted
through humanitarian means; and
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(3) this interference is authorized by relevant organs of the
internationally recognized authority where states are voting members (e.g.
the United Nations.)
Although INTh seems to capture the essential elements of what constitutes any
military humanitarian intervention, it has a clumsy feel. The difficulty with INTh is that
it is complicated and that it has potential conflicts of interest among the purposes of (i)
protecting the agency's nationals, (ii) protecting interests considered vital to the agency,
(iii) supporting succession, (iv) or for counter-intervention, with the clearer humanitarian
purpose of (v) preventing a serious violation of fundamental human rights. Purpose (v)
seems to be the overriding criteria for allowing a humanitarian intervention. By
intending to prevent or halt a serious violation of fundamental human rights, an agency
will fulfil the requirement of having a humanitarian cause. Nevertheless, as I discussed
earlier and history has shown, not all interventions are humanitarian in nature. Thus, to
distinguish between humanitarian interventions and interventions in general, and for
discovering whether we can justify intervention. I will define “intervention” as
Intervention
=<jf an agency interference, by force or coercion, into the
affairs of a target (i) to protect the agency’s nationals, (ii) to protect
interests considered vital to the agency, (iii) to support succession, (iv) for
counter-intervention, or (v) to prevent or to put a halt to serious violations
of human rights.
In addition, I will define a “humanitarian intervention” as
Humanitarian Intervention =df an intervention authorized by relevant
organs of the internationally recognized authority where states are voting
members for the sole purpose of preventing or putting a halt to a serious
violation of fundamental human rights; such that this interference has (a) a
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humanitarian cause, (b) a declared humanitarian end, (c) a humanitarian
outcome, and (d) is conducted through humanitarian means.
In addition, one could further divide humanitarian intervention into categories -
Coercive and Non-coercive Intervention. Coercive Interventions include both (a) forcible
military and (b) coercive non-military intervention, while Non- coercive Interventions
include (c) non- forcible military intervention, (d) non-coercive, non-military
intervention, and (e) transnational, intergovernmental, and non-governmental modes of
non-forcible intervention
.
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Since I am specifically concerned with the use of military force in either a
coercive or non-coercive role, I further explicate “humanitarian intervention” to involve
military forces. Some examples of these interventions include distributing aid, coercive
air strikes, and other non-traditional categories of military humanitarian intervention.
These include peace making, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Peacekeeping
typically involves the use of “neutral” forces, with the mutual consent of the parties
(within the target), to maintain a cease-fire. Peace enforcement is the forcible
interposition of military forces between warring factions. Peace enforcement does not
require consent because “the political, military and legal [means employed] are
tantamount to an international declaration of war against one or more parties to the
conflict.”
24
Peace making is the initial phases of nation building. It requires full active
participation of target party(s), and it focuses on redress of wrongs, establishing
boundaries, and restoring government infrastructures.-' Therefore, for continuity
throughout the remainder of this project, I will use “humanitarian intervention to
explicate any of these humanitarian-type military supported interventions.
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A Military Intervention?
The concept of using soldiers, whose primary role involves killing their enemy in
combat, to conduct humanitarian interventions may seem strange at first. However,
many interventions, intended only to distribute food, medicine, and clean water, have
been conducted by the military or with the help of the military. Consider the examples of
Operation Turquoise in Rwanda and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Both were
humanitarian relief interventions that required multinational military forces to ensure that
supplies were distributed evenly, fairly, and to remote areas.
Few would argue against using military forces to deliver supplies to remote areas
for disaster relief. Often, armies are mobilized at home to provide relief from flooding,
hurricanes, drought, and other natural disasters. Yet, some people strongly disagree with
sending forces oversees to conduct these same operations in other countries. This is
especially apparent when there is the threat of possible casualties to the intervening
forces during their mission. Yet, to ignore the plight of others would be intolerable.
Of course, “ [military forces alone are an inadequate tool for the essential tasks of
resolution ....”
26
Nevertheless, although not their primary mission, soldiers are ideally
suited for these humanitarian interventions involving supply distribution. The structure
of military forces lends itself to humanitarian interventions. Armies generally have
established and well rehearsed command structures. In addition, military forces are well
trained in the distribution and transportation of different kinds of supplies. They also
have the vehicles and capacity for logistics distribution.
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However, what about peacekeeping operations and other humanitarian
interventions such as peace enforcement? Not only do these interventions involve the
presence of military forces; they also often require the use of force. Even many of those
who support the use of soldiers in humanitarian interventions involved in providing
logistical relief, hesitate to “put our soldiers in harm's way.” However, the situation in
the target state may prevent the distribution of supplies. Soldiers are trained to adapt in
inhospitable and even hostile situations, likely to be found where intervention is needed
most. “Soldiers are not like Peace Corps volunteers or Fullbright scholars or USIA
musicians and lecturers - who should not, indeed, be sent oversees to dangerous places.
Soldiers are destined for dangerous places, and they should know that .”27 Furthermore,
feeding refugees will not end atrocities like genocide and ethnic cleansing. “Stopping the
violence and preventing its recurrence are the first and most essential tasks during the
mitigation phase of the intervention cycle. Without these, other forms of intervention
will be premature and likely to fail.” When diplomacy fails, sometimes only the use of
force can end a conflict. Furthermore, a show of force alone often does not end
atrocities. “Demands made by the international community were only honored when tied
to effective uses of military force .
”“9 Sometimes, as the EU is arguing in Kosovo, force
is required to end genocide. Recall that former UN Secretary General Dag Hammerskold
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said, “peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it.”
Ideally, international police forces would be used for intervention; however, none
exist. Increasingly, the UN has sponsored humanitarian interventions using forces
provided by member states under UN control. Yet, often these interventions have limited
effectiveness, because of the differences between the members' forces.
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For example, many consider the UN capable of peace operations across
the full spectrum of mitigative tasks. Although extremely useful for
consensual peacekeeping and peace making operations, recent cases in
Somalia and Bosnia illustrate the limits to the effective use of the UN
(blue helmet) forces for peace enforcement operations. This is because of
the ad hoc nature ofUN force structure; lack of organic equipment, and
bifurcated lines of command and control render UN forces unresponsive,
inflexible, and relatively ineffective as combatants. Semi restrictive rules
of engagement can allow fighting forces to retain efficiency as peace
enforcers; however, the violent nature of unabated conflict requires
combat efficiencies not found within the UN structure/ 1
Whether or not they are more successful in fulfilling a humanitarian outcome,
interventions by formally trained military alliances (e.g. the NATO intervention in
Kosovo) appear to be more efficient than the ad hoc formation ofUN forces.
Nevertheless, any intervention, like any military operation, has inherent possibility for
casualties. Should the fear of casualties keep us from doing our duty, which is stopping
the depredations and genocide? The international community’s delay in conducting an
intervention in Bosnia and their withdrawal of forces from Somalia to open our eyes to
the dyer consequences of our hesitation. General Mladic, leader of the Bosnian-Serb
forces involved in the “ethnic cleansing’' in Bosnia-Herzegovina recognized and
capitalized on this fear. Speaking about why the international community had not
intervened in Bosnia, Mladic said, “the western countries have learned they cannot
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require their own children to realize goals outside their homelands.
Not every humanitarian intervention requires the use of military forces. However,
history has shown that there are times and there are situations where the only way to end
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gross violations is by use of force. We cannot stand idle while these atrocities take place.
Besides the fact that innocents are loosing their human rights, these massive violations of
human rights destabilize a region as much as any war. Ignoring these threats to peace is
akin to abandoning our fellow man. We must ask ourselves, “[I]s this a cause for which
we are prepared to see [our] soldiers die? If this question gets an affirmative answer,
then we cannot panic when the first soldier or the first significant number of soldiers, like
the eighteen infantrymen in Somalia, are killed in a firefight.”33
A Legal Precedent for Intervention
Part of the force of the first clause in the definition of “humanitarian
intervention,” “upon authorization by relevant organs of the United Nations,” is the
requirement for a legal sanction for intervention through the auspices of the United
Nations. One should note, however, that there is also a competing long-standing tradition
of non-intervention in the legal community, which dates back to the eighteenth century.
In 1758, one of the fathers of international law, de Vattel wrote, “states have rights to
legislate and administer justice without interference from outside their borders.”
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This
idea was further upheld after World War II in the International Court of Justice in 1945.
In its decision of the Corfu Channel Case the court found that, “the alleged right of
intervention [has] . .
.
given rise to most serious abuses and such cannot, whatever be the
?35
defects in international organization, find a place in international law.
Some theorists who support intervention find it futile to locate a legal precedent
for intervention in international law. Haas thinks that interventions are not justified
through international law. He said that justified interventions are multi-lateralK
sanctioned acts imposing unwarranted behavior on a state, not justified by legal precedent
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but legitimized by the twin pillars of global moral consensus and reasonable
effectiveness. Indeed, a legal precedent for intervention is problematic.
The elusive definition of "intervention," and determining what (if anything)
justifies intervention, hinder the passage of international legislation concerning allowable
interventions. Yet, to abandon the search for legal grounding for intervention seems
imprudent. As customary law suggests, the use of forcible self-help to protect human
rights is allowable, so might providing assistance to bolster another’s self-help to protect
human rights be allowable.
For many years the notion of “forcible humanitarian intervention was below the
threshold of Article 2(4), because it was strictly limited and temporary, and did not
threaten the ‘territorial integrity or political independence’ of the target state.”3 ' A legal
precedence was not deemed necessary. Nevertheless, embedded in the very' Charter of
the United Nations are the legal writings supporting justified interventions. Protection of
human rights is one of the raisons d'etre of the United Nations.
The United Nations
Fundamental to the founding of the United Nations (UN) were recognition of
human rights and an international effort to protect these human rights in the aftermath of
the horrors of the Nazi concentration camps. In the first Chapter, outlining the purpose of
the UN, Article 1(3) reads, “the purposes of the United Nations are ... achieve
international cooperation in . . . encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” Pursuant to
protecting human rights was a firm affirmation to maintain stability and peace between
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nations. To ensure (and if need be enforce) interstate stability and peace, the Security
Council was formed from the main body of the UN. 39
As India's intervention in East Pakistan and the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina
have demonstrated, regional conflicts — including civil wars — rarely remain isolated and
tend to spread beyond local borders. Often conflicts involve neighboring states and lead
to a de-stabilization of the region. Even so called '‘internal disputes,” such as the
Rwandan fighting between the Tutsi and Hutu, often lead to massacres causing hundreds
of thousands of refugees to flee across neighboring borders.40 If we interpret these
conflicts and violations of human rights as threats to the stability of the “maintenance of
international peace and security,”41 the Security Council, acting on behalf of the UN, may
legally take international action to restore the peace.
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Of course, the preferred methods of restoring peace and security are diplomatic,
without the use of force. Chapter VI of the UN Charter outlines several pacific ways of
restoring international stability through “negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement,”
4
'’ and so on. If. however, the parties fail to find a
diplomatic solution, they must refer the problem to the Security Council for possible
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action under Chapter VII.
Chapter VII of the Charter concerns action with respect to threats to peace,
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. Under Chapter VII. the UN might consider
threats to peace and breaches of the peace grounds for intervention. UN Article 42
outlines the move from a more peaceful solution to the introduction of forces or the use
or demonstration of coercive force.
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Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article
41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations,
blockades, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of
the United Nations.4 ^
However, some might argue that the fighting in Bosnia, the chaos in Somalia, and the
killings in Rwanda are only local conflicts and actually pose no significant threat to
international stability and peace. One often hears the common complaint, “Why should
we get involved when it does not involve us, our national interests, international or
regional stability, and so on?” One argument for international intervention is that threats
to international stability now come from other non-military areas. Consider the economic
impact of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Shifting the balance of natural resources
distribution may not only have a monetary' impact, but also may cause states that are
dependent on these resources to feel threatened. In 1992, the Security Council released a
Presidential Statement arguing that “non-military sources of instability in the economic,
humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security.”
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Furthermore, apart from reacting only to threats against international peace, the
UN can take diplomatic and forceful action to uphold human rights. The international
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community could take massive human rights violations as ispo facto threats to peace.
UN Article 55 reads that, “the United Nations shall promote ...(c) universal respect for
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. This Article
echoes the purposes of the UN established in Chapter 1 ot the Charter. Additionally, the
UN may legally and forcibly act in support of human rights through Article 56. Article
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56 authorizes the use of force to end severe violations of human rights. “All members
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization
for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.”49
Invoking a response to a perceived threat to peace, the Security Council passed
several resolutions. Obeying these resolutions, several states have provided forces to the
threatened regions. There have been seven UN sanctioned humanitarian interventions
between 1990 and 1996. These recent interventions include (1) Economic Community
of African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia in August 1990 (SCR 866); (2) Operation
Provide Comfort and Operation Southern Watch in Iraq beginning in April 1991
(SCR678, 688); (3) UNPROFOR in Bosnia in August 1992 (SCR 770); (4) Operation
Restore Hope in Somalia in December 1992 (SCR 794); (5) Operation Turquoise in
Rwanda in June 1994 (SCR 929); (6) Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in
September 1994 (SCR 867); and the abandoned intervention into Eastern Zaire planned
for November 1996.'°
International Law Regarding the Protection of Human Rights
Further international legal authority for intervention, in particular humanitarian
intervention, comes from a general desire to protect and foster human rights. A
recognized founder of modem international law, Hugo Grotius thought, “certain rights
belong to every person by virtue simply of membership of the human race.
5
1
Grotius
thought that each individual had what we now call “fundamental human rights.' We
have these rights merely by being persons. Furthermore, Grotius believed that “there is a
universal obligation to ensure that these rights are respected/
0
' The problem with his
view of universal human rights is that there seems to be a difficulty in identifying which
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human rights are actually fundamental and which are merely products of our cultural and
social environments.
Following World War II, in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
was published to help define the “certain rights” Grotius identified. Although some
rights remain in dispute (some countries have refused to ratify the document), the UN
Charter combined with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides clear legal
impetus for interventions that prevent certain human rights violations. “[There] can be no
doubt that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another
country, whatever their political affiliation or objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful
intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international law.”53
Many of the international laws concerning human rights were created following
the Nuremberg trials. International attention to the criminal proceedings surrounding the
actions of the Nazi government lead to public outrage over the inhuman treatment of
Germany's own citizens. This outrage encouraged the formulations of the UN and lead
to documents such as the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” This phenomenon
became known as “Nuremberg Law.”
The trials at Nuremberg centered around four criminal counts. Prosecutors
accused the Nazi government of Count One - conspiracy to commit aggression for
planning the invasions of Poland, Russia, and France, and also Count Two - crimes of
aggression which were labeled “crimes against peace" for the actual invasions. Count
Three, committing war crimes, involved the ill treatment of prisoners of war, wonton
damage of property, killing of hostages, and plunder. In addition. Count Three included
the enslavement of civilians for forced labor. These war crimes were violations of the
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Geneva conventions and other international treaties. 54 However, the fourth count of
crimes against humanity’ was a new and (at that point in time) undefined crime.
Crimes against humanity involved “murder, extermination, enslavement, and
other inhuman acts'0 ' as well as the “persecution on political, racial, and religious
grounds." 36 From these proceedings. Raphael Lemkin coined the term “genocide.”57 By
finding the defendants guilty of Count Four, the Nuremberg judges set the precedent for
laws protecting human rights. Crimes such as genocide are now internationally
recognized as criminal acts and are punishable under international law. The fallout from
the Nuremberg Trial lead to the International Law Commission in 1950 later reporting
that:
The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international
law: ...(c) Crimes against humanity: Murder, extermination, enslavement.
deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population.
co
or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds....
These international laws regarding crimes against humanity, in particular genocide, were
promulgated through the 1 948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide.
With a foundation based on the protection of human rights and the maintenance of
international peace and security, the UN Charter provides the basis tor legal intervention.
Furthermore, recent treaties involving respect for human rights issues and the
international recognition of genocide as a crime, further reinforces a legal precedent for
intervention. “Governments and armies engaged in massacres are readily identified as
criminal governments and armies (they are guilty, under the Nuremberg code of crimes
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against humanity.) The possibility of legal interventions does not remove a state’s
right of sovereignty guaranteed by non-intervention laws and legal tradition. However,
when states are involved in the criminal acts of genocide and their actions threaten
international peace and stability, legal grounds exist for international intervention with
UN cooperation.
Conclusion
With so many different examples of intervention, it has been difficult to provide a
definition for what constitutes a military humanitarian intervention. Opaque conditions
for defining “intervention,” accompanied by a long legal tradition of non-intervention
have limited the recognition ofjustified interventions. To proceed with a study of
justified intervention, I initially sought various definitions of “intervention” to pull the
essential conditions from each of these definitions. Looking through past and current
literature concerning intervention, I attempted to select those conditions that codified
interventions in the past. Reducing the set of intervention conditions, I formulated a
definition of “intervention” that applied the principles of agency, target, method, and
purpose. Intervention is an agency interference, by force or coercion, into the affairs of a
target (i) to protect the agency’s nationals, (ii) to protect interests considered vital to the
agency, (iii) to support succession, (iv) for counter-intervention, or (v) to prevent or to
put a halt to serious violations of human rights.
Furthermore, I refined the definition to reflect the criteria commonly considered
necessary for a humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention, I propose, is an
intervention authorized by relevant organs of the internationally recognized authority
where states are voting members for the sole purpose of preventing or putting a halt to a
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serious violation of fundamental human rights; such that this interference has (a) a
humanitarian cause, (b) a declared humanitarian end, (c) a humanitarian outcome, and (d)
is conducted through humanitarian means.
Furthermore, I discussed the use of military forces and sometimes military force
during humanitarian interventions when the intervention situation demands. Military
experience in logistics distribution becomes very useful during interventions.
Additionally, peaceful intervention operations including the distribution of needed food
and medication are often blocked by ongoing conflict or by the malicious intents of
states. Only an adequately equipped and trained military force is sufficient to end the
conflict to allow other peaceful operations to continue.
I next proceeded to locate and describe the legal precedent for intervention.
Embedded in the Charter of the UN lies the foundations for the recognition and
protection of human rights. I have also described how interventions can legally counter
the threat to international peace and security. In fact, the international law is so clear and
well supported that members of the UN would be shirking their responsibilities if they
refused to participate in stemming the spread of international violence and preventing
genocide.
I will discuss the apparent dilemma between intervention and a state's right to
sovereignty in detail in Chapter 5. Legal grounds for intervention does not necessitate
intervention, nor will it pose a threat to sovereignty and the tradition ol non-intervention.
However, “governments and armies engaged in massacres are readily identified as
criminal governments and armies"
60
and might temporality lose the right to sovereignty.
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By committing genocide or threatening the peace, these criminal states would be legally
open to intervention.
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CHAPTER 3
A DEONTOLOGICAL APPRAOCH TO INTERVENTION
Introduction
There has been a resurgence of news interest surrounding the former Khmer
Rouge regime in Cambodia. On March 6, 1999, the last leader of the Pol Pot regime, Ta
Mok, was captured and will now face criminal charges. He will be prosecuted for crimes
against humanity and for his part in the genocidal “killing fields” rule of the Khmer
Rouge during the 1970’s. During the Khmer regime, between 1975 to 1979, an estimated
1 .7 million people died of war. hunger, and disease. The genocide continued unabated
until the Vietnam’s 1978-79 intervention ended the Khmer Rouge rule. 1 “Vietnam’s
public justification was the need to remove a genocidal regime. Clearly, in light of what
we now know went on inside Kampuchea [(Cambodia)] ... the justification carries a high
degree of validity.”
2
The outcome of the intervention was positive. The genocide ended
and a new government ruled Cambodia.
The problem with the intervention, which all but negates the positive
humanitarian outcome of ending genocide, is that Vietnam informally controlled the new
Cambodian government and remained in Cambodia under the Treaty of Friendship until
1989. While initially a very humanitarian action, Vietnam’s intervention does not seem
to satisfy the conditions for a humanitarian intervention I formulated in Chapter 2. Recall
that I formulated humanitarian intervention as
Humanitarian Intervention —df an intervention authorized by relevant
organs of the internationally recognized authority where states are voting
47
members for the sole purpose of preventing or putting a halt to a serious
violation of fundamental human rights; such that this interference has (a) a
humanitarian cause, (b) a declared humanitarian end, (c) a humanitarian
outcome, and (d) is conducted through humanitarian means.
A major portion of this formulation of humanitarian intervention is its humanitarian
principle. At the heart of what makes an intervention humanitarian is the “purpose [of]
preventing or putting a halt to a serious violation of fundamental human rights.” Yet,
Vietnam's actions betrayed their real non-humanitarian intention to place a “friendly”
government in Cambodia. In retrospect, the intervention into Cambodia was
questionable at best. Nevertheless, the intervention stopped the genocide and Vietnam's
official position appealed to the international view of a state’s duty to protect human
rights when Vietnam ousted the Khmer Rouge regime. But, did Vietnam have a duty to
intervene?
In the last chapter, I discussed the legal precedent for protecting human rights.
However, where do these rights come from? Grotius thought, “certain rights (now called
human rights) belong to every person by virtue simply of membership of the human
race.”
3
Furthermore, Grotius believed that, “there is a universal obligation to ensure that
these rights are respected.”
4 However, we must also ask, “Even if we acknowledge the
existence of human rights, how do we move from the principles of human rights to the
corresponding duties involved in protecting human rights?
In order to locate this transition from rights to duties, we must look at the
pertinent moral philosophic writings concerning rights and duties. In past philosophic
writings, there is limited discussion of intervention, and most of the theories tend toward
the principle of non-intervention. In his “A Few Words on Non-Intervention, Mill
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opposed intervention in general and further proposed that interventions be limited to
severe cases. Kant also desired to limit interventions. The fifth preliminary article of
Thoughts on a Perpetual Peace reads. No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution
and government of another state.”6 Both philosophers seem well disposed to the
principle of non-intervention. Yet, humanitarian interventions, as I have defined them,
were unknown to Mill and Kant. Their theories were a product of their time and did not
include intervention as a means of ending violations of human rights. While territorial
wars and other aggressive invasions were rampant during this period, philosophers of the
times had no concept of the contemporary notion of genocide. Perhaps if they were alive
today, Kant and Mill would adapt their theories to accept my definition of “intervention”
that includes a humanitarian purpose.
Kant, Mill, and other earlier philosophers were not totally ignorant of the concept
of human rights. In fact, we derive our modem notion of “fundamental human rights”
from works developed from earlier theories. In addition to Grotius, another international
jurist, Alberico Gentili, believed in the concept of human rights formed from a “kinship
of nature.” His work, De Jure Belli Libri Tres (written in 1598), reads, “Of an honorable
reason for waging war . . . the subjects of others do not seem to me to be outside that
kinship of nature and society formed by the whole world. And, if you abolish that
society, you will destroy the unity of the human race."
These key humanitarian principles were molded into theories during the
Enlightenment. During the Enlightenment, several political theorists and philosophers
(e.g. Hume. Rousseau, and Locke) published influential works, which outlined the ideals
of liberty, justice, “inalienable rights,” and equality. In 1791, the French government
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adopted the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens,” encapsulating the ideas
of natural human rights. Included in the “sacred rights of men and citizens” is the
declaration that, “men are bom and always continue, free, and equal in respect of their
rights.” Furthermore, the declaration defined the end of political associations as, “the
preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man.”8 Thomas Jefferson,
inspired by the liberal principles of Locke and Rousseau, wrote “The Declaration of
Independence” for the revolutionary American Colonies. “The Declaration of
Independence” incorporated liberal principles into the foundation for building a nation. It
reads, “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they
are endowed by their Creator with unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness.”
9
Modem philosophers built on this tradition. In spite of his support of non-
intervention, Kant also believed that we enjoy certain rights - rights that not only are
inalienable but universal as well. In Thoughts on a Perpetual Peace . Kant defends the
theory of universal human rights grounded in “the purity of its origin, a purity whose
source is the pure concept of the right.”
10
Furthermore, these rights are “perceived by
human beings a priori , independently from their experiences and traditions.’ These
same ideals were promulgated in the World Conference on Human Rights of 1993. (One
hundred seventy-one nations adopted it on June 25, 1993, in Vienna). Paragraph 5 reads,
“All human rights are universal, indivisible and inter-dependent and inter-related. The
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on
the same footing, and with the same emphasis."
1
"
I propose that if there are indeed
13
human rights, we have corresponding duties vis-a-vis these rights.
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Contrary to Teson, who "is endeavoring to reorient the established conception of
international law, returning more to the position adopted by Grotius, whereby
intervention is always permitted, provided that the cause is just,” 14 I think that only
certain interventions should be permitted. I will focus on how some cases of massive
human rights violations lead to deontological arguments to intervene. 15 I will begin by
outlining two theories by which these corresponding duties arise from human rights. The
first theory proposes that we have certain primafacie duties with respect to human rights.
The second theory proposes that we have duties from a Kantian/Rawlsian social
contractual view towards human rights. Regardless of how these duties arise from human
rights, I will use the analogy of the Good Samaritan to show how violations of these
rights might impose some obligations for us to intervene.
Further, I will discuss several notions of how the duties and rights of the agency
and the target are related. For example, some duties of the victims (target state) pass on
to others (states, the international community, or the UN) opening the way for
intervention. Additionally, I will discuss H.L.A. Hart's notion of the differences between
general and specific duties, and present a form of "Guardian Relationship that might
address how the agency acquires the duty to intervene.
Political realists such as Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Kennan propose that
international intervention could never be a duty.
6 They believe that (1) there is no
international society, and that (2) there is no such thing as an international morality.
Thus, for a realist, the decision to intervene or not, while politically important, is morally
irrelevant. I disagree. I will show that political, legal, and economic interdependence
lends credence to a form of “international community.” Furthermore, I will discuss
how
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intervention can lead to increased stability and international credibility - both of which
are politically desirable for the state. Finally, I will discuss how a realist argument for
non-intervention is non-tenable.
Prima Facie Duties
W. D. Ross introduced the formal concept ofprimafacie duties in his work, The
Right and the Good . He believed that obligations were not derived from a utilitarian
concept that proposed “what produces the maximum pleasure is right.” 17 Instead. Ross
thought that an act is obligatory in its own nature - not from its consequences.
Furthermore, he thought that certain acts were right or wrong based on their
characteristics, “in virtue of [them] being of a certain kind (e.g. the keeping of a
promise).” These he named primafacie duties. He divided these duties into six
categories: duties of fidelity, duties of repatriation, duties of gratitude, duties ofjustice,
duties of beneficence, and duties of self-improvement.
18 Would Ross consider
intervention a primafacie duty? If an intervention wras a primefacie duty, would the
intervention fit into any of these duty categories?
Recall that Ross' formulation of a primafacie duty was based on the act's
characteristics by “virtue of being of a certain kind. If we consider that the particular act
of intervention is of a certain kind, such as protecting human rights, preventing genocide,
feeding the hungry, etc.. Ross might well consider that act of intervention a prima facie
duty. Assuming there are universal human rights, severe violations of these rights may
generate primafacie duties. The U.S. Catholic Bishops wTOte.
Human life, human rights and the welfare ot the human communitv are at
the center of Catholic moral reflection on the social and political
order.
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Geography and political divisions do not alter the fact that we are all one
human family, and indifference to the suffering of numbers of that family
is not a moral option.... [Furthermore,] military intervention may
sometimes be justified to ensure that starving children can be fed or that
whole populations will not be slaughtered. 19
“[Ensuring] that starving children can be fed or that whole populations will not be
slaughtered." seems similar to the “characteristics of a certain kind” Ross had in mind for
defining primafacie duties. Yet. feeding the children and stopping slaughter seem too
specific to fit into one or more of Ross’ duty categories. We need a humanitarian
principle that encompasses such humanitarian purposes. In his paper, “Humanitarianism
and the Laws of War," Anthony Hartle offers two humanity principles upon which the
laws of war are based. They are HP1 : Individual persons deserve respect as such, and
HP2: Human suffering ought to be minimized.20 While HP2 focuses on the consequences
surrounding suffering. HP 1 has some potential for forming primafacie duties. If one
could apply HP1 as a principle that relates respect for others to human rights, acts that
protect these rights might be primafacie duties. Hartle writes:
Respect for persons entails the ideas of equality of consideration and
human dignity. Individual persons cannot be treated with respect for what
they are unless they are considered equally as persons . .
.
[where a person
is] a rational being capable of independent choice and thus deserving of
respect from other rational beings solely on the basis of that status.
Human dignity is inherent in such a concepts
1
Suppose we have a situation similar to the massacres under the Pol Pot regime.
Hundreds of thousands of people are being starved, persecuted, and killed. To intervene
would be a primafacie duty under the principle that “individual persons deserve respect
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as such." Human dignity is inherent in the concept of respect for persons. The
starvation, persecution, and murder in the target state constitute violations of human
dignity and thereby violates the principle of respect for all individuals.
Let us for a moment assume that we have a prima facie duty to intervene in a
particular circumstance. If we consider an intervention as aprimafacie duty, the duty of
that intervention seems to correlate with Ross' duty categories ofjustice and beneficence.
Justice, Ross thought, involves the distribution of happiness. Corresponding duties of
justice are derived from ensuring an equal distribution of happiness. Perhaps the equal
distribution of happiness includes each individual's human rights. Recall that Thomas
Jefferson wrote that inalienable rights include “life liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,”
and that Hartle thought, “individual persons cannot be treated with respect for what they
are unless they are considered equally as persons.” Specifying that happiness entails
the inalienable human rights enjoyed equally by all persons, intervention becomes a duty
ofjustice.
We could also conceive that, in addition to being a duty ofjustice, there is also a
primafacie duty of intervention that falls under “duties of beneficence.” Ross thinks that
some duties rest “on the mere fact that there are other beings in the world whose
condition we can make better.”2 ^ These he categorizes as duties of beneficence. Indeed,
this category seems to embody the purposes behind humanitarian intervention. "Human
life, human rights and the welfare of the human community are at the center .. .political
divisions do not alter the fact that we are all one human family.”
^
Furthermore,
protection of these rights ensures an equal respect for individuals. Intervention becomes
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a primafacie duty when violations of these rights become severe. Indifference to the
suffering of large numbers is not a moral option.
A Kantian/Rawlsian Approach
Another way that duties can be derived from human rights is through the theories
proposed by Kant, and later by Rawls. Contemporary theorists such as Teson, Wicclair,
and M. Smith are attempting to adapt Kant and Rawls’ theories to portray a duty to
intervene from either universalizable maxims or appeals to principles derived from
operating under a “veil of ignorance.”2 ' Although these theories have their differences,
their basic premises are similar enough for us to generalize. The basic structures and the
conclusion that sometimes there is a duty to intervene are the same. Thus, instead of
describing their nuances, I will generalize to provide an interpretation of their theories.
Teson, Wicclair, and M. Smith's theories each entail two stages of moral
reasoning. First, one follows Kant’s categorical imperative procedure. This involves
choosing a maxim that can be followed by all rational individuals. Then, one wills this
maxim to be universalized in a presumed “new social order.” If we imagine that the new
social order actualized after the maxim has been adapted, the agent then asks himself
whether he could follow that maxim .26 This first stage of adopting a universalized
maxim, and determining if one could live under it, is similar to Rawls theory of the “veil
of ignorance.” Under the veil of ignorance, everyone must acknowledge the possibility
that he or she will turn out to be the least advantaged. Each person, should they find
themselves in this position, will then agree to the principles that would favor them
-
27
“Everyone maximins.”
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Further, these Rawlsian-type veiled egoists will agree on two basic principles of
justice, because they do not know whether they are among the disadvantaged or not.
These justice principles are (1) equal liberty for all. and (2) benefits to the disadvantaged
with these benefits open to everyone. Equal liberty “would establish those rights that are
guaranteed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” 28 The principle
of distributing benefits to the disadvantaged (“difference principle”) would ensure “that
social and economic inequalities be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.” 2Q and
require that the positions of advantage are equally accessible to all. 30
The second stage takes the maxims (principles) developed under the veil of
ignorance and advances them to the international level. This stage, according to
Paragraph 58 ofA Theory of Justice , requires the members of the societies to nominate
“ambassadors” who will gather and determine which maxims are internationally
pertinent. These ambassadors from the Rawlsian societies then decide among themselves
which principles become international law (jus gentium):
1
But, what would make the ambassadors' choose a principle of humanitarian
intervention over a general principle of non-interv ention? An objector to intervention
could pose an argument surrounding the premise that the ambassadors would promulgate
a principle of non-intervention based on the maxim supporting the sovereign rights of
states, or in this case “the Rawlsian societies.” Because they were under the veil of
ignorance, they would not know if they were members of an agency or of a target. Since
they might value a principle including the right of self-determination over a principle
based on protection of rights, these ambassadors might conclude that intervention
is
wrong.
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I disagree. Wicclair's “Rawls and the Principle of Nonintervention,” addresses
this possible objection. He thinks, “these representatives will not choose the absolute
principle of nonintervention, but rather a principle that condones humanitarian
intervention on behalf of human rights.”32 The question of which principle the
ambassadors will adopt is not based directly on the issue of sovereignty and self-
determination. Rather, the question surrounds the legitimacy of the state they represent.
These hypothetical ambassadors will not know what type of state they live in. If they
knew that they lived in a just state, they would be confident in applying a principle of
non-intervention. However, they cannot be sure that the state in which they live is not
unjust. “They will choose such a principle [of intervention] because the veil of ignorance
will keep them from knowing whether or not their own state is unjust, in which case the
only source of salvation may be with foreign intervention.”
A Tesonian individual who is already convinced of the rightness of
Rawlsian principles will, under the veil of ignorance, be afraid that he or
she will turn out to belong to an unjust state. And such a person,
following a maximin strategy that seeks to make what is intolerable as
tolerable as possible . . . will have no difficulty recommending that
humanitarian intervention be allowed .'
4
Under the veil of ignorance, we cannot know for sure if we will be the victims living in
an oppressive state. These ambassadors, assuming that they could be from an unjust
state, apply the principles of equal liberty and distribute benefits to all, ensuring that they
are sufficiently “cared for” should they indeed find themselves members of the
disadvantaged.
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Thomas Pogge argues that intervention is obligatory for a different reason. He
believes that we have a duty to intervene because of our participation in an “unjust global
scheme.’' His summarized argument suggests that our international society has created
the situations that prescribe intervention. We have caused this humanitarian need
because of our active participation in corrupt regimes, by denying the distribution of
technology and resources to the Third World, and by stymieing the economic growth of
other nations. Yet, Pogge also writes, “we are asked to be concerned about human rights
violations not simply insofar as they exist at all, but only insofar as they are produced by
social institutions in which we are significant participants .”35 Pogge proposes some
compelling reasons why our past negative actions demand some recompense.
However, Pogge’s argument seems to limit the cases of human rights violations
where intervention would be obligatory. “[This argument] restricts our duties to cases of
human rights violations that have (or can be shown to have) resulted from our past to
present involvements. If there are indeed human rights, we ought to have corresponding
duties vis-a-vis these rights ,’
06
whether we are the cause or not.
An Analogy
Regardless of whether the duty to intervene is a primafacie duty, penance for past
sins, or based on principles founded under the veil of ignorance and adapted as
international maxims, violations of human rights seem to demand some type of action.
The question is what is the proper level of response given some degree of violation.
There seems to be no scale to measure the severity of these violations. Is any violation
ot
a human right substantial enough for intervention? Does an insignificant violation
generate a duty to intervene? An objector might say, “[certainly,] we cannot presume
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that the violation of a right in itself results in an obligation for bystanders to intervene on
behalf of a wronged individual .”37
Consider a scenario where you witness a mugging in an alley while walking
downtown. An old man is lying on the ground clutching his head yelling, “Help! I need
help!" What do you do? Obviously, the mugger violated one or more of the old man's
rights. Should you intervene? You were just walking along minding your own business.
Your rights are not being violated. Suppose your only two alternatives are to either assist
the injured man or continue walking past. If you stop to render assistance you will be late
to your destination, but you will also be helping the injured man. Yet if you continue
walking you might feel guilty. Would you have a duty to intervene? By ignoring the
cries for help, you will be violating a right of the injured man - the right of assistance.
“[You] will be criticized for violating the universal right of all individuals to receive
38
assistance when they are in serious difficulty....”
The universal right to receive assistance is the foundation for the so-called “Good
Samaritan Laws.” It has become illegal to pass an accident scene and not render some
appropriate form of assistance. This right to receive assistance generates an obligation to
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all of us as witnesses or bystanders to a disaster, an accident, or to a crime.'
The story of the Good Samaritan is an example of the right of all
individuals to receive assistance from others in time of need. The Good
Samaritan’s obligation is the duty correlative to this right ... our
obligation to assist those who are suffering violations of their rights is a
sub-class of our general right to assistance in a time of need ....
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Under any other circumstances, the old man in the mugging example is obligated to look
after himself. He has a duty to protect his rights. Thus, the intervening agent has no
obligations to intervene in the man’s life while the man can care for himself. At any
other time, the agent’s intervention might be considered interference in another's affairs.
However, because the old man was incapable of acting for himself, intervention on his
behalf became the duty of the agent walking by.
The Samaritan only has a duty in this situation because the stranger
obviously is not in a position to look after himself. [Normally,] it would
be the duty and the prerogative of the stranger to look after himself, and it
would be the normal duty of the Samaritan to refrain from interfering in
his affairs. It is only because this normal circumstance has been
overturned that it is no longer presumptuous but is instead the duty of the
4
1
Samaritan to intercede in the vital affairs of the stranger.
Similarly, in the international community, states are normally obligated to refrain
from interfering in one another's affairs. However, should a state or a group ot
individuals lose their ability to protect themselves under the right of self-help, the
international community has a duty to protect their universal right to receive assistance.
As the Samaritan was obligated to help the mugging victim, the international community
must render aid to the victims of the other state. Intervention becomes obligatory.
I have shown how the Samaritan has an obligation to assist the victim because of
the victim’s universal right to assistance. This was a life-threatening
situation, which
would seem to be a severe violation of the victim's human rights. However,
there still is
no accurate scale to measure the severity of these violations
obligating assistance. It
seems that any violation of a human right is substantial enough to
require action.
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Additionally, it appears that even an insignificant violation can (and it would seem
actually does) generate a duty to intervene. This is one of the unresolved objections to
deontological arguments for intervention. Unless the agent could view a duty to
intervene as primafacie less important than a duty to perform some other act, the agent is
obligated to intervene. Placing one’s duty to intervene above all other duties might lead
to the kind of universal guilt Father Zossima's younger brother experienced in The
Brothers Karamazov. He was convinced that, “everyone of us is responsible for
everyone else in every way. and I most of all.”42 It might be possible for all violations of
human rights to obligate us to intervene. However, “ought” implies “can,” and some acts
of intervention to stop human rights violations may not be valid alternatives. In Chapter
4, 1 discuss this objection further and present a consequentialist argument for
intervention.
Duty Relationships
In the Good Samaritan example, the bystander assumes the duty to intervene
according to the right of all individuals to receive assistance. However, how does this
duty pass between the mugging victim (who gives up the duty) and the passerby (who
gains the obligation)? In this section, I will discuss how duties pass from one agent to
another.
H.L.A. Hart has a different view of duties and duty bearers. In his paper. "Are
there any Natural Rights?,” he categorizes duties according to the relationship between
the agent and those affected by her actions (the target). Hart draws this distinction
between what he calls general duties and special duties. Hart s special duties arise
from
the relationship between family, friends, past relationships, and even within
contractual
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agreements. Special duties arise out of the closeness of the relationship between the
agent and the affected individuals. Special duties are also distinct because they have an
identifiable duty-bearer. Hence a father has certain special duties to his daughter and a
lender has special duties to a lien holder. Alternatively, general duties are duties that are
owed to everyone by everyone. For example, everyone has a general duty to come to the
assistance of those in need. In addition, unlike a special duty, the duty-bearer is not
specified for a general duty.
4 ^
The best way to demonstrate the distinction between general and special duties is
through an example. Consider the duties of a lifeguard. Suppose that a man is swimming
in a public area without a lifeguard on duty. He is alone in the water but the beach is
crowded. Unfortunately, the man begins to cramp and starts struggling to stay afloat.
Unable to continue swimming, the man yells for help. A group of accomplished
swimmers on the beach hears his cries for help. No one on the beach knows the
struggling man; therefore, the swimmers have no special duties towards him. If there
were a lifeguard on duty, she would have a special duty to assist the swimmer because of
the lifeguard-swimmer relationship. However, there is no lifeguard present. Because
there is a general duty to come to the assistance of those in need, each swimmer has a
duty to attempt to rescue the man .
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Thus, as the Samaritan had a duty to help the
mugging victim, the qualified swimmers cannot allow the struggling man to drown.
Likewise, an international police force would have the special obligation to ensure
that violations of human rights were prevented, or at least stopped. They would be the
assigned duty-bearer, acting on behalf of humanity to keep the international peace.
Thev
could be tasked to prevent genocide, pursue war criminals for trial,
de-militarize warring
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factions, and carry out other associated peace operations. However, such a force does not
exist. Without such an international police force, who becomes the dutv-bearer? Is it
presumptuous to assume that these intervention obligations would simply be unfulfilled
just because there is no international police force? The obligation does not disappear.
Just as if one of the accomplished swimmers failed to rescue the drowning individual, a
failed attempt or the absence of the primary duty-bearer (Lifeguard) does not eliminate
the duty burden required of the other swimmers on the beach. Each swimmer is obligated
to try to rescue the man until he is saved.
4:>
Likewise, the international community is not
absolved of their general obligations, should the agency identified to intervene fail or (as
in the case of the international police force) should the community fail to identify a duty-
bearing agency.
This does not mean that only those assigned duty-bearers carry the moral
burden. The rest of the international community is not absolved of its
general obligation. Nations not required or unable to intervene are obliged
to act within other capacities. For instance Japan, which because of
historical reasons is not able to contribute troops to multilateral military'
efforts, can nonetheless fulfil its general obligation by contributing
financially or logistically .
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What is unique about Hart's distinction between special duties and general duties
is that everyone shares in the general duties. Consider the intervention in Somalia.
When U.S. and UN forces withdrew from Somalia, the country soon slid back into chaos.
Today, six years later, there is still no central government. Did the obligation to assist
the
Somalis end with the withdrawal ofUN forces? No. according to Hart s view of duties,
the obligation remains. The UN forces had a contractual special duty to intervene. But
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once they left, their special duty reverted to a general duty of the international
community. Further, this general duty still obligates the international community to do
something to assist Somalia.
It is precisely because there are general duties that we assign people with
specific roles to cany' out these duties. That is, general duties generate
special duties ... Special duties are not themselves the source of duties.
[They] are simply devices for mediating general duties; it determines who
should do what . 47
Similarly, Hart's view of duties provides the basis for arguments concerning the division
of labor during interventions. The U.S. government often complains of bearing too much
of the material, personnel, and financial burden for the recent international interventions,
and rightfully so. Even though they were obligated by the general duty to assist, the able
bystanders in the Good Samaritan story walked past the victim without providing aid.
Likewise, every able state is obligated to render assistance. What makes the complaints
valid and legitimate is that everyone - all states - has a general duty to stop severe
violations of human rights and other human suffering. Since there is no international
police force with a special duty to intervene, each state in the international community
should bear their share of the burden of intervention.
For any one state to take on more than their share of the burden would be
supererogatory. General duties are duties from everyone to everyone. There are no
specified duty-bearers. Therefore, the responsibility is split among those able to help.
Doing more would be laudable, but it is not required. Think about the soldier who throws
herself on a grenade to protect her fellow soldiers. She performs an act that cannot be
considered obligatory. She has no special duty to sacrifice her life to protect others.
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Neither does she have any more general duty to her comrades that they do towards each
other; she should be commended for her heroism, however, no one is morally required to
perform supererogatory acts .48
We have many special duties - duties to our family, duties to our friends, duties to
school and work, and even civil duties. Yet, sometimes, certain general duties can
outweigh our special duties at home.
In the case of wide-spread human atrocities in foreign lands, the
vulnerabilities of foreigners can become graver and more serious than
those of fellow contractees, and as such our general duties towards them
can override our special duties towards compatriots .
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Recall the story of the Good Samaritan. He had special duties to family and friends, but
he was also obligated by the general duty to render assistance to the mugging victim.
The victim had a right to receive assistance from others. “The Good Samaritan’s
obligation is the duty correlative to this right . .
.
[and] our obligation to assist those who
are suffering violations of their rights is a sub-class of our general right to assistance in a
time of need.”50
Elfstrom proposed a specific case of how our special duties may obligate the
international community to intervene. He calls the duty-bearing relationship the
“Guardian Relationship.” This guardian relationship is similar to the one defined by the
relationship between a mother and son, a minister to his parishioners, and a government
to the people it represents. He writes:
Nation-states have the legitimate authority to speak and act for the citizens
of those nation-states. There is an important factor which undergrids this
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perspective. In the eyes of the larger world community, the government of
a nation-state and its citizenry’ stand in a special relationship somewhat
similar to the special relationship between parent and offspring
.
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Yet, as we have seen in several areas around the world, this relationship seems to
dissolve when tested. The special duties built upon these relationships between states and
its people seem to vanish when greed or self-interest takes over. Just because the
responsible duty-bearer fails to take on their obligation, people still retain the right to
receive assistance. “[A] morally justified right does not just disappear or cease to direct
behavior when it is systematically violated. In such a case, the right’s capacity to
generate obligations may shift so as to increase the responsibilities of the secondary
[duty-bearers].” The disappearance of their government or the state’s ignoring of the
plight of their citizens does not erase the rights of the citizens, nor does it completely
absolve their duties.
Furthermore, a state’s diminishing special duty does not alter the general duties of
everyone outside that state. The general duties of the international community to ensure
that human rights are protected while distributing aid to the suffering and the less
fortunate are not diminished. In fact, these general duties might generate special duties
for the UN. certain states, and other agencies to intervene.
It does not follow, because there is currently no assigned or established
institution to defend human rights, that no one state has a duty to do so
should the need arise. In such a case, members of the international
community have a duty to see to it that the community's duty is carried
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Suppose that general duties actually exist that obligate the international
community to intervene. Because there is no international police force, either individual
states would be obligated to intervene or obligated to provide forces under an UN
mandate for intervention. Some would argue that the obligation to use internal forces for
purposes other than self-defense violates the state’s neutrality. “[To] say that a state has a
duty to intervene is to deny its sovereign right to remain neutral .”" 4
Although this line of reasoning seems valid, the pseudo-isolationism caused by
states strictly adhering to their right of neutrality is purely theoretical. States are too
economically dependent upon each other to simple ignore another’s pleas for assistance.
In addition, strict neutrality would negate the effectiveness of international treaties.
Finally, the actions of unjust states might weaken their claim to a right of sovereignty.
“If we are willing to subject state sovereignty to human rights considerations, then it
follows that the rights neutrality can be overridden when the call of human rights so
demands, when human rights abuses are “terrible" enough."''
In this section, I have argued that the international community has certain duties
generated from universal inalienable rights of all individuals. These duties are either
derived as primafacie duties, or through a Kantian/Rawlsian process of international
adaptation of universal maxims adopted under the "veil of ignorance. Nevertheless,
both of these theories concern respect for individuals and the universal right of
individuals to receive aid in the time of need. Additionally, I have demonstrated Hart s
differentiation between special duties and general duties. Moreover, I have shown how
the international community gains the duty to intervene. Pope John Paul II stipulated
that, “humanitarian intervention be obligatory' where the survival of populations and
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entire ethnic groups is seriously compromised. This is a duty for nations and the
international community itself.”56
Realism
Niebuhr. Morgenthau, and Kennan and other political realists would disagree with
the deontological argument for intervention. They would propose that international
intervention could never be a duty.' 7 In fact, they believe that states do not have any
international duties except one - self-interest. Their beliefs are founded on two basic
principles: (1) there is no international society, and (2) there is no such thing as an
international morality. For a realist, the question of whether to intervene or not to
intervene is morally irrelevant. They would suggest that what is important is the balance
of power and the political effect. Thus, a notion that individual states have a general duty
to intervene to stop serious human rights violations would seem incomprehensible to a
realist.
Yet, what makes the realist view so apparently at odds with the deontological
argument? One answer is that a realist derives her beliefs about the question of
intervention from a realist point of view. This realist point of view is founded on
“assumptions about human nature, the importance of the state, the struggle for power as
the dominant feature of an anarchic international milieu, and the preeminence ot the
national interest defined in terms of power."'
8
States exist in a Hobbsian “State ot
Nature,” each competing with the other for power and gain.
To this war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent, that
nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and
injustice have there no place, where there is not common power, there is
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no law: where no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the two
cardinal virtues.
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To the realist, the mere concept of some sort of international community is ridiculous and
counterintuitive. I will formulate this principle as
Realist Rule
=<jf A state will act according to its best interests.
States act as individuals, each pursuing their own interests. They interact with other
states solely to further their own advantage.
Furthermore, there is no international entity legislating laws and providing justice
over the individual states. Thus, as in Hobbes' State of Nature, there is no concept of
international right and wrong. No international morality exists. With no existing
international morality, the idea of duties obligating states to come to the aid of another is
incoherent. Realists believe agencies undertake interventions solely for the self-interest
of themselves.
Moreover, trying to show where intervention is morally justifiable is futile.
For a century and a half, statesmen, lawyers and political writers have
tried in vain to formulate objective criteria by which to distinguish
between legitimate and illegitimate intervention. They have only
succeeded in clothing the interests and policies of their respective nations
within the appearance of legitimacy.
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Although, historically states have intervened for their own purposes, it does not follow
that all interventions are rooted in purely self-interest. Consider the example of India s
intervention into East Pakistan discussed in Chapter 2. India had a humanitarian purpose
and the intervention had a humanitarian end. Even if all interventions are
rooted in self-
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interest, does this necessitate abandoning justified interventions? A deontologist could
argue that the international community’s general duties serve to fulfil the states’ self-
interest. One might further argue that stopping genocidal slaughter is in everyone’s self
interest. Of course, to offer her objection, the deontologist must show that there is some
type of international community.
Part of the realist objection to accepting intervention as a duty is that there is no
international society to give such a moral foundation a meaningful context. 61
Realism denies the existence of an international society, where “society”
is understood to apply to states coexisting in mutually recognized
interdependence, according to common and binding rule and with a
significant degree of shared moral and cultural understanding.
Two facts seem to support the realist claim that there is no international community.
First, states (as individuals) do often act in apparent self-interest. Second, apart from the
UN, there is no organization that encompasses all the separate states. Additionally, as I
discussed in Chapter 2, the UN has limited jurisdiction over the affairs of the states.
However, history has shown that states do not operate in a vacuum. There is an overlap
of interest on issues ranging from technology and communications to interdependent
economies and political treaties. Military interests are also expanding from a purely
internal state-function to multi-state organizations and treaties. This is best exemplified
with the formation of international units such as the Franco-German Brigade and the
NordBat units of Scandinavia, and the recent acceptance of the Czech Republic,
Hungary' , and Poland into NATO. Furthermore, as was prevalent during the Cold War.
“cooperation grows with development of technologies of large-scale destruction.
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States often sign treaties and form agreements that actually limit their self-interest.
Interdependence furthers the individual state’s good by furthering the common good.
The UN may not constitute an international government, yet the individuals in
every state are members of the human race. Perhaps this membership is not enough to
define an international society. However, combined with the interdependence of states,
membership in the human race lends credence to the presence of an informal
international society, if not a formal one. Foucault wrote, “there exists an international
citizenry, which has its rights, which has its duties, and which promises to raise itself up
against every abuse of power, no matter who the author or the victims .”64
The other argument that forms the foundation of realist thought is that there is no
international morality, and there can be no international morality. This principle leads
Hans Morgenthau to argue that states both intervene and oppose intervention whenever it
is in their interest. Moral and legal arguments serve no function other than “to discredit
the intervention of the other side" and to “justify one's own.
* 6
‘ Empirically, Morgenthau
may have an accurate observation of how states use moral arguments to justify or
discredit another’s actions. However, it does not follow that intervention can never be
morally justified. “Ought implies can." “If politics cannot be moral, it is not the case
that they ought to be moral, nor, [more importantly,] that they ought not to be.
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Regardless of whether realists are correct to say that there is no international
society and there is no such thing as international morality, a case for intervention can be
made based purely on realist reasoning. First, there is a realist case for intervention to
ensure or reinforce international stability. A state might argue for intervention in order to
structure a more orderly international system .
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Moreover, as states often restrain their
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immediate self-interest because of economic interdependence, states might obligate
themselves to ensure stability between other states. Long-term trade growth and a
reduction in the risk to security that results from global stability are both within the self-
interest of states. “All states have an interest in global stability and even in global
humanity,” Walzer writes, “and in the case of wealthy and powerful states like ours, this
interest is seconded by obligation.”68
Furthermore, justifying intervention might provide realists the additional benefit
of establishing the international credibility of the agency. A realist might reason that, “no
one will take us seriously as a great power if we allow this [(genocide, forced
deportations, mass starvation)] to occur.”
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In addition, in order to facilitate fulfilling a
state’s self interest, demonstrated international leadership during a multi-lateral
intervention becomes an important part of foreign policy. This is being currently
demonstrated in the U.S.-led peace initiative for ending the Kosovo conflict. Thus, states
could also make a realist case for intervention by improving its position as a great
70
power.
Finally, a realist should recognize that the notion of a common humanity does not
have to be contrary to the vital interests of states. The UN Independent Commission on
International Humanitarian Issues reported that, “Sovereignty need not conflict with
humanitarian concerns if states can be brought to define their interests beyond the short
term .”
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Just as states subordinate their sort-term interests, sign treaties, and form
international organizations, states can recognize the long-term benefits of
universal
human membership and the benefits of protecting corresponding human rights. "The
interests of common humanity, which transcend national boundaries are not a
menace to
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the vital interests of states.” * Even Morgenthau thought that no foreign policy could
allow mass extermination, even if this genocide might somehow be deemed beneficial to
national interest. He thought that absolute moral principle existed, “the violation of
which no consideration of national advantage can justify .” 73
I have demonstrated that realists often condemn the principles of intervention and
non-intervention as hopelessly naive. They argue that no international community exists
to judge interventions. However, a lack of formal international community alone does
not prevent us from making moral judgements about intervention. In addition, although
realists seem to promote a policy of non-intervention, the realist position lacks specific
justification for a principle of non-intervention. “[In] their specific policy
recommendations, they almost always oppose intervention on grounds of prudence .” 74
The long-term benefits to individual states, as well as the interdependent relations
between states, combined with the undeniable universality of membership in the human
race, render realist arguments against intervention in general untenable.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I sought to formulate a deontological approach to intervention.
Herein, I have demonstrated a basic deontological argument for intervention based on
certain inalienable rights. By analyzing the rise of theories concerning human rights and
their generated corresponding duties by Ross, Kant. Rawls, and others, I have shown how
these duties to intervene are grounded in human rights. In addition, I showed that these
corresponding duties are determined either by viewing intervention as a prima facie dut\
or as a maxim derived under the veil of ignorance.
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Regardless of how these duties evolve from certain rights, I demonstrated the
differences between duties we have from our relationships, contracts, and business
(special duty) with duties that everyone shares (general duty). In discussing Hart's
distinction between special and general duties, I have shown that the obligation picked
out by a special duty does not vanish when the primary duty-bearer is unable to fulfil it.
General duties obligate everyone. In addition, there might be special duties that obligate
a secondary duty-bearer. States, like individuals, also have special and general duties.
Their general duties correspond to universal human membership. When a states fails to
fulfil its special duty, other states' general duties override.
In the face of human disaster, however, internationalism has a more urgent
meaning. It is not possible to wait; anyone who can take the initiative
should do so. Active opposition to massacre and massive deportation is
morally necessary; its risks must be accepted.
°
I have demonstrated that a realist argument for a principle of non-intervention is
implausible. Denying evidence of an interdependent international community is counter-
intuitive and goes against the realists' own theory of state self-interest. Stability,
credibility, and the pursuit of a prominent international leadership role by conducting
interventions when the violations are severe contribute to the interests of the intervening
state. Additionally, there is little evidence to show that acknowledging and valuing
human rights is contrary7 to a state s self-interest. Moreover, protecting these rights might
be in the best interests of the state. "Thus if it can be shown that ... interventions can
also be obligatory, then "nothing to be gained by us can no longer be a valid excuse tor
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inaction.
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The deontological position is not flawless. Some problems remain unresolved. A
principle of “ought implies can" cannot eliminate the possibility that small non-severe
human rights violations might obligate the international community to a costly
intervention. Furthermore, how do we judge the rightness of actions, specifically
interventions? And, how can we resolve which duty takes precedence when faced with a
scenario where duties collide? Although widely accepted, a deontological moral view is
not universally accepted. Nevertheless, as UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar said in
1991, “the principle of non-interference with the essential domestic jurisdiction of states
cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively
77
and systematically violated with impunity.”
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CHAPTER 4
A CONSEQUENTIALIST ARGUMENT FOR INTERVENTION
Introduction
The problem of determining whether to interv ene in another nation's affairs is
currently a “hot” topic in the media. On 18 June 1998, the New York Times published an
article in its Editorial section titled. “The Kosovo Dilemma.” The author, William Safire,
analyzed the current situation in Kosovo and proposed intervention as a solution to the
growing problems there. He suggested that only by a credible show of force, such as
NATO air strikes, will the Serbian government stop their “bloody crackdown” in Kosovo.
Additionally, Safire said that we should tell the Albanians in Kosovo that the air strikes
are not meant as cover for their secession, but as an international intervention to end the
“ethnic cleansing.” He proposed that if diplomacy and other negotiations fail to bring
peace to the region of Kosovo, intervention may be the only solution. 1 Although, what
Safire recommends is military intervention, the intent of the intervention is humanitarian
in nature - ending the ethnic cleansing.
While the decision to intervene is being debated in the media and in both the legal
and political arenas, as of late, the issue of military7 intervention* for humanitarian reasons
has not received much attention in moral philosophical circles. This has not always been
the case. Several books and articles published during the Vietnam conflict tried to
answer questions concerning the legitimacy of the United States involvement in
Vietnam. During the Seventies, philosophers posed deontological and consequentialist
arguments both for and against U.S. involvement in South East Asia. In addition, during
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this time, Michael Walzer published his influential book. Just and Uniust Wars which
provided a non-interventionist argument against U.S. involvement by contrasting the Just
War Tradition with a peoples^ right to self-determination.4 Lately, however, the focus of
ethical discussions has shifted elsewhere, and the question of intervention has been left
largely to political philosophers. Furthermore, large portions of moral writings recently
published on the question of intervention are limited to deontological theories. They are
interpretations and applications of deontological normative ethics and concern
themselves with whether an intervention can be obligatory because it would be wrong not
to intervene (to help others, to end conflict, to protect human rights, etc.). ?
What has been lacking in this limited philosophical discussion of intervention is a
consequentialist point of view on the question of intervention. This does not mean that
recent discussions have ignored the various consequences of an international
intervention. Rather, these discussions have been focused on whether we as fellow
human beings have a duty to intervene to prevent or end such atrocities as the “ethnic
cleansing” in the former Yugoslavia, the starvation and anarchy in Somalia, and the
genocide in Rwanda. This duty follows from suggested theories that, for example, (1)
intervention is a morally right act. or (2) failure to stop “ethnic cleansing" and genocide is
wrong.
An intervention to “save” or “protect our fellow man from such human rights
violations has a large appeal to both deontological and consequentialist advocates of
human rights. Kok-Chor Tan writes:
Human rights are, after all, the claims of all of humanity on all of
humanity. Respect for human rights generates ... duties to protect from
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deprivation, and duties to aid the deprived. Thus if members of the
international community take human rights seriously enough (enough to
ratify and endorse them), then it appears that they have a primafacie
moral obligation to ensure the effective exercise ofthese rights, (my
emphasis).
6
However, the obligation to intervene need not be entirely a question of moral law, an
appeal to a Kantian categorical imperative, causal responsibility, or even a fulfillment of
a contract. The international community may have an obligation to intervene based
solely on the consequences (or resulting state of affairs).
7
I believe that sometimes the international community is obligated to intervene.
However, I suggest that this obligation can also exist on the basis of the consequences of
intervention, not on the notion that any failure to protect human rights is wrong, etc. A
consequentialist may support intervention based on a theory involving human rights. She
could say that it is morally obligatory to perform acts that lead to the greatest human
rights protection. However, a deontologist might say that violating human rights is
wrong and any act that prevents this violation is our duty - regardless of the
consequences .
8 To show that intervention could be consequentially obligatory, I will first
outline the consequentialist framework that I will use. Next, I will describe how to
evaluate the consequences of intervention. Then. I will build from simple examples to
demonstrate how an intervention would be obligatory. Additionally, I will address some
potential shortcomings of a consequentialist view: an objection of potential unforeseen
consequences and an objection regarding the problem of providing continuing aid.
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“Wait a minute,” some opponents of intervention are already saying, “surely he
cannot mean that every intervention is obligatory!” This might lead to the following
reductio ad absurdum :
If one ought to intervene in country A, one ought to intervene in country
B, C, D, E, .... It would be impossible to intervene in A, B, C, D, E ....
One only ought to do what one can do. (“Ought” presupposes “can.”)
Therefore, one ought not to intervene in country A . 9
My answer is, of course not. Not every situation warrants an intervention. Some
interventions are obligatory while others are not. Whether or not to intervene is based on
the consequences of that intervention. Accordingly, some interventions will have
“better” consequences than others. Thus, I will also show that the first premise is false,
that intervening in countries B, C. D, E, ... does not follow from intervention in country
A. By using a consequentialist theory, we can certify when an intervention is obligatory.
A Consequentialist Framework
In order to evaluate whether intervention is obligatory, I suggest evaluating the
proposed intervention in terms of the resulting state of affairs. Thus, I will use Fred
Feldman's world theory consequentialism. His world theory version of consequentialism
can be summarized as WTC:
WTC: a person, S, ought to see to a state of affairs, P, as of time, tl, iff P
is true of all of S’s best worlds at tl .
10
Of all the possible worlds (worlds that are actualizable) accessible to S at time, tl, certain
worlds are “better” than other worlds. They have a higher “moral value. For example,
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if a world includes a state of affairs, P, has a higher value when compared to a world that
does not include P, the worlds that include P are “best” worlds.
However, in order to apply the world theory to international intervention, we need
to assume a Hegelian-type theory' that the state could function as a person. 11 Thus,
assuming states act as individuals and amending WTC, we have WTC':
WTC': a state, S, ought to see to a state of affairs, P, as of time, tl, iff P is
true of all of S’s best worlds at tl
.
Application of WTC' to certify whether a particular intervention is obligatory is not
difficult. If a state of affairs includes intervention and is true in all of the agent's best
worlds, then the agent ought to see to that state of affairs and intervene. Conversely, if a
state of affairs includes non-intervention and is true in all of the agent’s best worlds, then
the agent ought to see to that state of affairs and not intervene. To explore the application
of WTC' to intervention further, I will discuss two examples: a case of personal
intervention (WTC) and a case of international intervention (WTC').
Tim and Kristen are both dining out at the same restaurant but have never met.
Suppose that Tim sees Kristen apparently choking on a bone across the room. Kristen's
face is blue and she is wheezing and clutching her throat. For simplicity, let us assume
that there are two states of affairs available to Tim, P and P\ The state of affairs P
includes Tim performing the Heimlich maneuver on Kristen, while P' does not include
any assistance for Kristen; Tim just continues eating. WTC states a person, S, ought to
see to a state of affairs. P, as of time, tl, iff P is true of all of S’s best worlds at tl . As it
so happens, for Tim, the state of affairs P was true at his best worlds while P' was not
true at his bests. Seeing her distress, Tim rushes over and performs the Heimlich
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maneuver on her, thereby freeing the stuck chicken bone and saving Kristen’s life.
Alternatively, if P is not true at Tim s best worlds and P' is true, Tim ought to see to P'
and not assist Kristen.
Notice that Tim’s action is a form of intervention at the individual level. He
intervened in Kristen s life by administering the Heimlich and saving her life. Recall that
if a state of affairs includes intervention and is true in all of the agent’s best worlds, the
agent ought to see to that state of affairs and intervene. However, if a state of affairs
includes non-intervention and is true in all of the agent’s best worlds, the agent ought to
see to that state of affairs and not intervene. For Tim, the state of affairs P (intervene on
behalf of Kristen) was true at his best worlds while P' (not intervening) was not true at
his best worlds. Thus, Tim ought to see to P and intervene; seeing to P is obligatory for
Tim. On a personal level, WTC provides a working illustration for determining that Tim
should intervene to help Kristen. Next, I will describe a case at the international level to
demonstrate that WTC' works for intervention into another state.
Assume there are two states: Beta and Alpha. Beta’s neighbor, Alpha, is
undergoing a civil war. Beta’s borders are flooded with mass deportations and refugees
fleeing the fighting in Alpha. Additionally, there are rumors of “ethnic cleansing.’’
Philosophers Teson. Tan. and Elfstrom, would suggest there may be an obligation for
Beta to intervene because failing to protect the human rights of Alpha's citizens, “ or
failing to prevent the threat to their own national security ,
13
is wrong. However, Beta
may be obligated to intervene from a consequentialist point of view, as well. Again, for
simplicity, let us assume that Beta has two states of affairs, P and P . The state of affairs
P includes intervention to end the civil war, stop the flow of refugees, and provide
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humanitarian aid. P does not include intervention or a provision for assistance to the
citizens of Alpha. According to WTC\ a state, S, ought to see to a state of affairs. P. as
of time, tl, iff P is true of all of S's best worlds at tl . For Beta, the state of affairs P is
true at its best worlds while P' is not true at its best worlds. Beta mobilizes and
intervenes, ending Alpha's civil war. Under WTC\ if a state of affairs includes
intervention and is true in all of the agent's (in this case Beta’s) best worlds, then the
agent ought to see to that state of affairs and intervene.
Nevertheless, P' might have been true at Beta’s best worlds, not P. If, in the case
of WTC', intervention was not part of the state of affairs that was true at Beta’s best
worlds, intervention would not be obligatory. If a state of affairs includes non-
intervention and is true in all of the agent’s best worlds, then the agent ought to see to
that state of affairs and not intervene. This last example illustrates why only certain
interventions would be obligatory. Deciding to intervene is based on which state of
affairs is true at Beta’s best worlds. Contrary to an example of a deontological theory,
which might suggest that states are forbidden to fail to protect human rights. Beta does
not have an obligation to intervene. In this case, the obligation is based entirely on the
states of affairs. This point will become more important during my discussion of some of
the objections to intervention.
Both proponents of intervention and opponents of intervention will ask how one
can evaluate the consequences of intervention. For theory WTC', evaluating
consequences becomes a question of determining the best worlds for S. Unlike
traditional Hedonic Act Utilitarianism, World Theory does not directly involve particular
consequences themselves. A Hedonic Act Utilitarian state would count the total hedons
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and dolors of the consequences to determine if intervention is obligatory. Next, the state
would need some axiology defining what qualifies as a hedon and dolor amount. States
could have misapplied axiologies, thus, making it difficult to determine how to evaluate
the consequences of intervention. Misinterpreting the axiology may result in states
applying different perceived values to the act of intervention. World theory avoids this
difficulty. By focusing on the state of affairs true at its best worlds, a state can discover
whether intervention is obligatory for itself.
By evaluating states of affairs that include intervention, states can use WTC' to
determine when to intervene and when they are obligated to refrain . 14 However, applying
WTC' (or other consequentialist theories) to the potential obligation of intervention can
be controversial and open to objection. Therefore, I will next discuss two major
consequentialist-type objections to interventions. By outlining these objections and
providing some solutions. I will show that consequentialism may obligate states to
intervene, and that WTC' is the correct theory to use.
One objection focuses on the premise that if we ought to intervene in one country,
we should intervene in all other countries. The other objection concerns the follow-on or
future consequences that are unforeseen at the time of decision that may arise during the
intervention or at the conclusion of the intervening mission. I believe that both
objections are incorrect and. under a certain interpretation, involve slippery slope
fallacies.
88
jf_A State Intervenes In One Country. It Must Intervene In Others?
The first objection I will discuss is the reductio previously mentioned in my
introduction. David Fisher discusses this objection in his paper. “Some Comer of a
Foreign Field.’ Although he does not attribute this argument to any particular individual,
he suggests that it typifies the objections of the “man in the street” as well as much of
today's political rhetoric opposing intervention. This objection can be summarized as
follows:
OBJ 1 : If one ought to intervene in country A. one ought to intervene in
country B, C, D, E, .... It would be impossible to intervene in A. B, C. D.
E .... One only ought to do what one can do. (“Ought” presupposes
“can.”) Therefore, one ought not to intervene in country A.
An opponent of intervention might ask, “How do we escape being drawn down a slippery
slope towards involvement in all kinds of interventions?” This is, on the surface, a
reasonable question. However, OBJ1, although valid, is not sound. Part of the fallacy of
OBJ1 is that it has several different interpretations. Initially, a proponent of OBJ1 might
be considering a case in which intervention in each country has the same value of
consequences. Furthermore, even if we grant the assumption that each intervention has
the same consequential value (the states of affairs that include the intervention are all in
the state's best worlds). OBJ1 still has different interpretations. These are based on the
time of the decision whether to intervene and when the intervention should occur.
The opponent of intervention may suppose that since the state was obligated to
intervene now, the state will later be obligated to intervene in another state. However,
this objection is a non sequitur. Since the decisions to intervene occur at different times.
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they are separate decisions with differing consequences. Thus, each decision is a new
problem where WTC' applies only to the situation at that time.
Consider the case where a state, S, is considering whether to intervene at a certain
time, tl . If a state of affairs, P, involves intervening in A and is true of all of S’s best
worlds at tl, then S should bring about P (intervene in A). At a later time, t2, if a state of
affairs, P
,
involves intervening in B and is true of all of S’s best worlds at t2, then S
should bring about P (intervene in B). However, at a different time, t3, if a state of
affairs, P", involves intervening in C but is not true of all of S’s best worlds at t3, then S
should not bring about P" (not intervene in C). While intervening in A and intervening
in B were obligatory for S, intervening in C is not obligatory for S. The state of affairs
that contain intervention in A is different from the states of affairs when determining
whether to intervene in B or C. Even in a case where S is obligated to intervene in C, the
obligation did not follow eo ispo from S’s obligation to intervene in A and B. Therefore,
if the objector suggests that if one intervenes now, she must intervene later, the first
premise that if one ought to intervene in country' A, one ought to intervene in country B,
C, D, E, ... is false.
An objector may consider that the consequences for intervening in each country
are equal and the decision to intervene occurs at the same time. If this is the objection,
then I would respond by pointing out that intervening in B. C, D, E, ... are nothing but
alternative states of affairs to one that includes intervention in A and the reductio breaks
down. The state can chose to intervene in A, B, or C. Assuming all alternatives are
equal, it does not necessarily follow that S must pursue all alternatives. That would be
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absurd. If S is obligated to intervene in some countries, but not others, the
consequentialist would say, “so be it.”
The objector may also want to argue that it would be impossible to intervene in A,
B, C, D, E .... In the first place, for OBJ1 to work in this hypothetical case, S must be
obligated to intervene in all of the countries. Should the states of affairs all be true in S’s
best worlds, the state may find itself in the predicament of being obligated to intervene in
all the countries. However, this rational is faulty. Obviously, intervention in more than
one state would introduce more than one different states of affairs. There may be the
individual state of affairs of intervening in A. the state of affairs of intervening in B. the
state of affairs of intervening in C, ..., but there could be states of affairs that include
some combinations of interventions and there could also be an alternative state of affairs
that involves intervention in all the states, { A, B, C, D, E,
Consider a case where there are only four states: S, A, B, and C. State, S, is
considering whether to intervene at a certain time, tl, in state A. If a state of affairs, P,
involves intervening in A and is true of all of S’s best worlds at tl, then S should bring
about P (intervene in A). If a state of affairs, P', involves intervening in B and is true of
all of S's best worlds at tl, then S should bring about P' (intervene in B). Additionally, if
a state of affairs, P", involves intervening in C and is true of all of S's best worlds at tl,
then S should bring about P" (intervene in C). At this point, S must also consider P
"
which involves intervention in A, B. and C. Does it necessarily follow that S must
intervene in A, B, and C? What if the national budget of S included money enough for
only two interventions? One might be tempted to argue that P is not true at all ot S s
best worlds at tl . Therefore, S would not be obligated to bring about P . However, this
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seems to yield a contradiction. S is obligated to intervene in A, intervene in B, and
intervene in C, yet not obligated to intervene in A. B, and C? This case seems logically
impossible. A look into the national treasury' does not remove the logical truth that P’”
must also be true at all of S’s bests. Perhaps the objector is taking a different approach -
one that deals with the logistical problems of multiple interventions.
Besides the states of affairs involving intervention in each country being of equal
value (true at S's best worlds) and the decision to intervene occurring at the same time,
the objector is posing a situation where the interventions occur simultaneously. If this is
the case, intervention in A, B. C, D, E, ... at the same time may indeed be impossible.
However, it would be impossible for other reasons, such as the political situation or
logistical constraints. A consequentialist may agree that it would be logistically
impossible or politically impossible to intervene simultaneously (this would not
necessarily affect obligation). However, if the state of affairs includes intervention in A,
B. C, D, E, ... is true at the state’s best worlds, as long as the state brings about the state
of affairs that includes intervention in A, B, C, D, E, ..., the actual interventions can
occur at different times. In this case, the interventions are not time dependent. As long
as the state of affairs actualized, the obligation (to bringing about P "') will be met.
Therefore, OBJ 1 does not pose a serious threat to a consequentialist evaluation of
intervention using WTC'. Intervention in B, C, D, E, ... does not follow from
intervention in A. Neither the time of decision nor the time of intervention matters.
Additionally, when considered together, the highly unlikely state of affairs that would
involve simultaneous intervention in all states: A, B, C, D, E, ... does not pose
difficulties for the consequentialist state. World theory merely says that whenever a state
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of affairs is true at its best worlds, the state is obligated to see that it is actualized. Thus,
whenever a state of affairs includes intervention and is true at its best worlds, the state is
obligated to intervene.
Objection from Unforeseen Consequences
Another form of objection arises from the possibility that some action, such as
intervention, would have some unforeseen negative consequences. Julia Driver discusses
an example of why one should not intervene because of the unforeseen bad consequences
in her paper, “The Ethics of Intervention.” Consider the previous Heimlich maneuver
example with some different conditions. Suppose that Tim sees Kristen apparently
choking on a bone in a restaurant. Kristen's face is blue and she is wheezing and
clutching her throat. Seeing her distress, Tim rushes over and performs the Heimlich
maneuver on her, accidentally breaking a couple of Kristen’s ribs. Unbeknownst to Tim,
Kristen was not choking, but merely acting out her part in a play for her friends.
Furthermore, Kristen will not be able to perform in the play with broken ribs. Tim’s
actions had the unintended effect of ruining Kristen’s playhouse debut. 15
Tim’s seemingly “good” act of saving Kristen’s life had the unforeseen “bad"
consequence of injuring her. Similarly, the decision to intervene in the former
Yugoslavia by conducting an arms embargo had some negative consequences. It seems
that the embargo did succeed in limiting the import of weapons into Bosnia and in
stemming the spread of the conflict to neighboring states. However, the embargo
negatively affected one side (the Moslems). The Moslem forces were unable to obtain
any heavy weapons during the embargo and, therefore, were unable to resist the Bosnian
Serb attacks. The Serbs had numerous heavy weapons they had obtained from the former
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Yugoslavian Army. 6 Assuming that the arms embargo was true at the best worlds, the
resulting state of affairs (including the unforeseen consequences) was still obligatory.
Although some examples posed by this objection seem to illustrate a legitimate
concern. I feel that an objection based on potential unforeseen consequences is
unfounded. Furthermore, both WTC and WTC' require that the agent ought to see to a
state of affairs, P, as oftime , tl , iff P is true of all of the agent’s best worlds at tl. The
time that S needs to see to a particular P is at a particular time - in this case tl. The state
of affairs P (intervene on behalf of Kristen) was true at Tim’s best worlds while P' (not
intervening) was not true at his best worlds. Which state of affairs is true at Tim’s best
worlds determines what is obligatory for Tim under WTC. Tim does not decide which
state of affairs is better for him. Similarly, in the case of the arms embargo, S (in this
case the UN and NATO) ought to have intervened with the arms embargo in accordance
with WTC'. The state of affairs P (intervene to prevent the spread of conflict through
increase in numbers of weapons) was true at S’s best worlds while P' (not intervening)
was not true at S’s best worlds. The popular saying is that, “hindsight is always twenty-
twenty.” The intervention later (say at t2) may not have obligated the state because of
some other unforeseen bad consequences. However, it does not necessarily follow that
intervention was not obligatory at tl
.
The Problem of Continuing Aid
Driver also mentions a different objection. When conducting an intervention,
there may be a potential problem with follow-on assistance, or what she calls "continuing
aid.” The completion of the initial intervention - including fulfilling the specified and
agreed upon objectives — may not shield the agency from further obligations. This could
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lead the intervention down a slippery slope where continuing commitments may never
end. “Acts that begin in armed humanitarian intervention
... can escalate to
peacekeeping, peacemaking, and the installation of democratic governments.” 17 On the
other hand, the intervention could fail and the obligation would be unfulfilled. Apart
from the difficulty that the agent may be obligated to continue aid when an intervention
fails, the agent may be further obligated for continuing aid upon the successful
completion of the initial mission. 18
The best example of the continuing aid problem (a “slippery intervention”) is the
intervention in Somalia. Because of the problems during the intervention in Somalia,
fear over the inability or unwillingness to continue aid has caused a kind of paralysis in
the international community. This type of paralysis has led the U.S. government and the
UN to become victims of what is being termed the “Somalia syndrome.” The Somalia
syndrome is a “fear of committing international forces to ill-defined missions of
humanitarian intervention.” 19 This international fear grew from the aborted UN
humanitarian mission in Somalia. It is generally agreed that the initial UN humanitarian
intervention in Somalia was successful. Tens of thousands of people were spared
starvation and limited order was restored.
-0
However, conditions on the ground changed
with the passage of SCR 837, a UN resolution designed to disarm all the factions. The
mission changed and the peacekeepers now found themselves peace-enforcers. They
were even involved in the capture of the leader of one faction. The Somali warlord.
Aidid. organized attacks on the peacekeepers, specifically Pakistani. Italian, and
Moroccan soldiers. Aidid was wanted by the UN command for the death ot twenty -four
Pakistanis. A failed U. S. mission to capture Aidid, which resulted in the deaths of
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eighteen U.S. soldiers and loss of life among other UN forces and civilians during
previous attacks, resulted in participating states withdrawing their forces from Somalia
.
21
The problem of continuing aid, although a political and logistical concern, is in
reality a slippery slope argument and is fallacious. Ernst Haas describes the continuing
aid problem of intervention in his article, “Beware the Slippery Slope.” He writes:
What if the misery is exacerbated by the kinds of conflict between
government and insurgents in which relief supplies are hijacked and relief
workers are killed? Then effective rescue measures call for UN
enforcement to ensure delivery of the supplies to the intended
beneficiaries. What if the enforcers cannot do their jobs unless the civil
war ends? In that case the UN must seek to mediate an end. . .
.
[E.g. in
Bosnia and Somalia] The next possible steps include holding an election
... to be followed by drafting a constitution .... Organizing and
monitoring the elections calls for educational measures. ... In the event of
a failure of democratic consolidation - a very likely event - there will
surely be a call for multilateral sanctions to impose democracy . 22
Each step is, of course, highly speculative. Furthermore, although each step of
converting to enforcement, then mediation, then monitoring seems intuitive, these steps
do not necessarily have to follow one another. Other intermediate steps may lie in-
between. Additionally, steps like civil war mediation may not be required. Each
intervention is different, with different circumstances. Using Haas' example as an
argument for non-intervention would be incorrect. The inevitability that civil war
mediation follows from enforcement may be intuitive but there is no evidence that it is
logical.
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Assuming, however, that Haas example has substance, a consequentialist would
analyze the example in one of two ways. Initially, she could consider the possibility that
all of the steps (enforcement, mediation, monitoring, sanctions,
...) do follow from one to
another. In this interpretation, the steps are all part of the same state of affairs that
included the intervention. If the state of affairs included intervention, followed by
enforcement, mediation, monitoring, and then sanctions, was true at her best worlds at tl.
then she is obligated to intervene and perform the “continued aid” as part of the same
state of affairs.
However, this particular combination of steps of continuing aid may not occur in
the same order, or occur at all. Furthermore, in the case of the Somalia syndrome,
participating states might argue that any state of affairs that included intervention,
followed by enforcement, mediation, monitoring, and then sanctions would not be
obligatory for them. They may even choose to ignore the possibility that an intervention
is obligatory. The inability to continue aid to the Somalis and the discontinued delivering
of humanitarian assistance has caused the U.S. and the UN to question whether
intervention is a morally right alternative. Driver says that:
... it would be morally problematic for the U.S. to interfere in difficult
conflicts, even when it is clear which side is right. Of course, the
reluctance to interfere will have many sources. But surely at least one
concern at the root of the reluctance is a concern that the U.S. could get
23
drawn into a long, bitter, deadly struggle if initial modest efforts fail.
A consequentialist might approach Haas' example differently, and perhaps
alleviate Driver's concerns that the risk of continuing aid could prevent interv ention. At
tl, the state of affairs that includes intervention may be obligatory for the state. The state
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of affairs may even include enforcement to ensure the delivery' of humanitarian aid.
Negotiating a peace settlement and monitoring elections might be a different state of
affairs at t2. At t2, if negotiating a peace, monitoring elections, and even pursuing
international criminals is a part of the state of affairs true at the state’s best worlds, the
state ought to see to that state of affairs. If not, then the state can withdraw as the UN
forces did in Somalia.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I provided a consequentialist look at the problem of intervention.
Although many might use the perceived negative consequences of intervention to object
to any intervention, I believe that intervention can result in many good consequences. By
evaluating the consequences of intervention, a state can determine when to intervene.
Furthermore, by using a world theory of consequentialism. as WTC', the state avoids the
pitfalls involving acts, various weights of consequences, and misapplication of the
axiology that plague other traditional consequentialist theories such as utilitarianism.
Additionally, WTC' should be very useful for those who think that intervention in
general may at times be obligatory, but are concerned that once intervention is condoned
in one case, it opens the possibility for mass cases of intervention (some of which may be
for the wrong reasons). Intervention in one state does not open the way for intervention
in any state. The state may not be obligated to intervene in other states or may not be
obligated to intervene at all. If the state of affairs including the intervention in question is
not true at the state’s best worlds, then the state is not obligated to intervene and should
not intervene.
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The deontologists are correct when they suggest that there is something repulsive
about mass starvation, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. However, continuing aid and a
mandate to intervene in every conflict may pose problems for their theories and for states
who follow their thinking. Intervening solely because it is the state’s duty, or intervening
because it is the duty of all of us to protect human rights, may, indeed incur the burden of
Haas' slippery slope or open cases of widespread, yet obligatory, intervention.
Furthermore, a duty to intervene seems to form the basis of Driver’s concerns over what I
described as the Somalia syndrome. Treating the decision to intervene from a
consequentialist point of view negates these worries. Each state of affairs that involves
intervention is evaluated as true at the state’s best worlds separately from the other states
of affairs that do not involve intervention. In addition, the state of affairs that involves
intervention and enforcement will be different from a state of affairs that includes
intervention and the mediation of a peace settlement, but lacks an enforcement role.
Treating the question of intervention through consequentialism allows states to intervene
and stop atrocities within their political and logistical constraints.
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Notes
As I completed writing this chapter, it seems that the threat ofNATO air strikes
convinced Milosovic to remove his forces from the province of Kosovo. This result has
been only temporary. In March 1999, NATO began air strikes to force the Serbs back to
diplomatic talks to try and resolve the issue of Kosovo autonomy and end Serb autrocities
in Kosovo.
' By intervention, I am referring to the definition: Intervention =df an agency-
interference, by force or coercion, into the affairs of a target (i) to protect the agency's
nationals, (ii) to protect interests considered vital to the agency, (iii) to support
succession, (iv) for counter-intervention, or (v) to prevent or to put a halt to serious
violations of human rights. In addition, I will define a “humanitarian intervention.” as
Humanitarian Intervention =df an intervention authorized by relevant organs of the
internationally recognized authority where states are voting members for the sole purpose
of preventing or putting a halt to a serious violation of fundamental human rights; such
that this interference has (a) a humanitarian cause, (b) a declared humanitarian end, (c) a
humanitarian outcome, and (d) is conducted through humanitarian means. See Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 5
INTERVENTION AND THE JUST WAR TRADITION
Introduction
One cannot turn on the television or pick up a newspaper without being assaulted
by the tragic loss of life caused by conflict in different comers of the world. In 1994,
over 500,000 Tutsi men, women, and children were massacred in Rwanda. 1 During the
fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) estimated that thirty to forty people died each day from the fighting or from
lack of medical supplies. Pictures from ITN and CNN showed the suffering of tens of
thousands of refuges that fled the fighting in both Bosnia and Rwanda. In fact, as of
1995. there were over fortv different states involved in internal or international conflict/
However, in that same time period, there have been only a limited number of
humanitarian interventions to stop the mass suffering. In spite of the media coverage and
our deep sense of morality, we are reluctant to get involved. Even after the formation of
the Untied Nations in 1947 to prevent such conflict and suffering, it is hard to believe that
someone in the international community has not intervened to stop or prevent these
tragedies.
The problem is, of course, more complicated than it seems on the surface.
International intervention,
4 by any workable definition, involves the intrusion of forces,
supplies, and/or observers into the territory of another state. Intervening into the affairs
of another state has often been condemned as a violation of that state s sovereignty
.
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The issue of sovereignty violation is not a modem development. Since the
seventeenth century, through the teachings of de Vittoria and Grotius, states have
recognized each other’s right to sovereignty.' Today, the Charter of the United Nations
protects this notion of sovereignty. Article 2(7) states that no nation can “intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”6 Apart from
the international legal position of a state’s right of sovereignty, Hegel and other
philosophers have suggested that states also enjoy the right of moral autonomy in
addition to sovereignty. Elfstrom proposed that, “nation-states themselves possess a
moral autonomy analogous to the moral autonomy possessed by individual human
beings. The moral autonomy of the nation-state is founded upon the collected moral
autonomy of each of its individual citizens.”7 A state’s right to sovereignty is well
grounded in history, legal precedence, and in political philosophy. Any attempt to justify
intervention must first consider the notion of sovereignty and demonstrate why the
international community should set aside a state’s sovereignty.
Despite the protection of a state’s sovereignty, the horrors of human suffering
demand some action from us. On one extreme, international humanitarian intervention in
every conflict would be implausible due to the monetary, material, and personnel
commitment. However, it seems reasonable to intervene in extreme cases, or in cases
were vital national interests are at stake. Thus, in order to justify an intervention, some
type of convention must be made. For example, we might formulate a set of rules,
conditions, or circumstances that would have to be satisfied, in order to intervene.
Regardless of which convention we adopted, guidelines for intervention would need to
account for the issue of sovereignty.
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However, instead of inventing some new rules governing intervention, I suggest
that we use the tenets of the Just War Tradition to justify intervention. Using the Just
War Tradition has several advantages. It is well documented, socially and theologically
acceptable, and it has been successfully used to address a number ofjustified sovereignty
infractions. The tenets of the Just War Tradition are not uncontroversial. However, these
tenets can provide a framework from which the international community (specifically the
United Nations) can determine when a state has forfeited its right to sovereignty, when
the UN can set aside Article 2(7), and when they can conduct a humanitarian
intervention. The question is, “Can the heliumjustum tenets accommodate the various
considerations of intervention?”
I think the answer is “yes.” I believe that by justifying their actions through the
Just War Tradition, the UN can selectively intervene in other states. To show that the
helium justum tenets can provide justification for intervention, I will begin with a brief
explanation of the Just War Tradition. My explanation will include both the conditions
for deciding to wage war (jus ad helium) and the conditions for the conduct of war (jus in
hello). Next, I will examine each tenet in turn to demonstrate how the Just War
Tradition, specifically the conditions forjus ad helium , can be applied to intervention.
Furthermore, I will show that the tenets that govern conduct in war (jus in hello) can also
apply to the intervening forces. Throughout, I will also discuss the various objections
that have been raised against the Just War Tradition tenets, as well as some objections
that opponents of intervention might raise in opposition to the Just War Tradition as a
framework for intervention. Specifically, I will address the objection to intervention
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based on the violation of sovereignty, and then show how states can forfeit this right,
thereby legally and morally opening their borders to intervention.
The Just War Tradition
Although the Just War Tradition was developed from early Christian thought, one
can trace the history of the Just War Tradition as far back as the Fifth century BC in
China, where warlords developed rules for combat. In fact, codes of conduct for battle
and rules of war are found within the historical background of many different cultures . 8
Nevertheless, St. Augustine is commonly recognized as the “Father of the Just Warfare
Tradition.” Augustine dealt with the first concepts of bellumjustum regarding the
apparent conflict between the rules of Heaven and the rules of Rome. Augustine
attempted to reconcile the apparent pacifist teachings of Jesus in the New Testament with
the legal obligation of early Christians to fight in their country’s (in particular, Rome’s)
wars. Although in Christian doctrine, it was primafacie wrong to kill, defense of the
state was an acceptable exception according to Augustine. To resolve the issue of when
fighting for the state was permitted, Augustine tried to provide a measure for determining
when war was justified. He wrote that:
Just wars are usually defined as those which avenge injuries, when the
nation or city against which warlike action is to be directed has neglected
either to punish wrongs committed by its own citizens or to restore what
has been unjustly taken from it .
9
Although Augustine is credited with founding the Just War Tradition, he never
developed his thoughts on bellumjustum into tenets or rules that sovereign states could
follow. St. Thomas Aquinas furthered the study ofjust warfare by interpreting
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Augustine’s writings and summarizing them into a set of rules. First, Aquinas wrote that
only a legitimate authority could initiate a war. In addition, he proposed that a ruler
should only wage war if that war has a just cause. Finally, he believed, a ruler should
only resort to war with the right intention. These rules, written in the Summa Theologica.
are still considered part of the Just War tenets today.
Sixteenth century philosopher, de Vitoria, and later Francisco Suarez, further
adapted and modified the tenets for just warfare. In addition to Aquinas' conditions of
legitimate authority, just cause, and right intention, they added three additional
conditions. These included: “the evils of war, especially the loss of human life, should be
proportionate to the injustice to be prevented or remedied by war; peaceful means to
prevent or remedy injustice should be exhausted; [and] an otherwise just war should have
a reasonable hope of success.” 10 Today these tenets are commonly referred to as the
tenets of proportionality, last resort, and reasonable chance of success, respectively.
Other Just War Tradition tenets suggest that the state must publicly declare war,
and that the state must use just conduct when fighting the war. With minor adjustments,
these tenets have remained relatively unchanged. Although current just war theorists
agree on a majority of the just war tenets, some philosophers suggest that the tenets of
just intent and just conduct do not belong. While today the separation ofjus ad bellum
andjus in bello is commonly recognized, some philosophers disagree on the division
between the tenets of each. Christopher and Walzer suggest that the just intent tenet is
extraneous and is incorporated in the other tenets. They also believe that the just conduct
tenet is ajus in bello issue. O'Brien disagrees. He maintains that a state must satisfy the
tenet ofjust conduct for the war to remain just.
1
1
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However, just conduct is not a tenet ofjws in bello. Rather, just conduct is a good
description of whatyfrs in bello means. There are two commonly recognized tenets of
just conduct in war that grew from the concerns over who could be legally attacked, what
means of attack could be used, and the treatment of prisoners. 12 The first tenet is
proportion. The principle of proportion states that, “the harm judged likely to result from
a particular military action should not be disproportionate to the good aimed at.” 13 The
second tenet, discrimination, concerns the problem of who can be justifiably attacked and
who are non-combatants. It theorizes that “non-combatants should be immune from
direct attack.”
14 From these tenets, international treaties, such as the Geneva
Conventions and the Leiber Code, were adopted in the hope of protecting innocents and
prisoners during combat. In addition, these treaties tried to limit some of the horror of
combat by restricting the types of weapons used. Although intended for war, I think that
these samejus in bello principles also apply during intervention. I will discuss their
significance later.
Although I have outlined a number of frequently suggested tenets for just
intervention, for continuity I will follow the popularly recognized tenets of the Just War
Tradition (proposed by Christopher and Walzer) for my discussion ofjust intervention.
In accordance with the Just War theory, Christopher and Walzer summarize the following
six historical conditions necessary for a nation to be justified in going to war: ( 1 ) The
war must have a just cause; (2) The war s potential gains must be proportional to the
losses; (3) The war must also have a reasonable chance of success; (4) The country must
publicly declare war; (5) Only a legitimate authority can declare war; and (6) Countries
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can only go to war as a last resort. Armed with these six conditions of bellumjustum. I
will modify them to reflect intervention and use them to define a just intervention.
The Tenets of Just Intervention
A state can declare war only if the cause is just. Similarly, the international
community must show just cause when it resorts to intervention in a sovereign state. On
the surface, it would seem that one could easily fulfill the condition ofjust cause for
interventions. Historically, however, warring states have defined just cause in many
different ways. Covall presents three “traditional” principles for just cause: (1) defense
against actual or threatened injury from some other state or states; (2) recovery of or
redress for the loss of that which lawfully belonged to or was lawfully due the injured
state; (3) punishment of the state or states guilty of wrong doing.
15
Regardless of what
other criteria are used, bellumjustum theorists commonly accept self-defense as a
primary justification for just cause. However, self-defense would not apply when
interventions were for humanitarian reasons. Humanitarian interventions rarely involve a
threat to security or self-defense. (Although, as I will discuss later, some states have
considered self-defense as the only legal recourse for violating a state's sovereignty).
Furthermore, bellumjustum theorists often cite territorial disputes as a legitimate case for
just cause.
16
The U.S.-lead Coalition used these same notions of territorial sovereignty
and Kuwaiti self-defense as justification for liberating Kuwait. However, using the cause
of territorial disputes applies only to interventions when a state s national secuntv is
threatened. Furthermore, the question of what satisfies a just cause is often susceptible to
debate. Therefore, we need to search further for a just cause for interventions.
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Consider the atrocities committed in Bosnia. Cambodia, northern Iraq, and
Rwanda. Would not the prevention of genocide and termination of “ethnic cleansing”
satisfy the condition ofjust cause? What about the mass starvation in Somalia? It would
seem that the senseless suffering of individuals in those countries would demand
intervention. Furthermore, from a deontological position, I would suggest that it is our
duty to stop these atrocities from occurring (Chapter 3). Their suffering is just cause for
the international community to intervene. Alternatively, if an operation was intended to
keep warring factions apart (peacemaking) or enforce a peace settlement (peacekeeping),
the cause would also be just. 17 Thus, for an intervention to have a just cause, the cause
must meet one or more of the following: prevent genocide, prevent ethnic cleansing,
prevent other serious human rights violations, or it must be undertaken for the purpose of
peacemaking, peacekeeping, and providing a rapid method for distributing humanitarian
aid. However, the list is probably not complete. Additional causes that may be defined
as just, although they are controversial, include capturing war criminals (e.g. from the
• 1
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former Yugoslavia) and conducting nation building (e.g. in countries like Somalia).
Applying the tenet ofjust cause will help ensure interventions are undertaken for the right
reasons.
The second condition ofjus ad bellum is that the costs of the war must be
proportional to the prospective gains. Thus when fighting a just war the potential
gains
must balance or outweigh the potential losses. Likewise, the costs
must not outweigh the
gains. One of the major factors considered before deciding to intervene is the
cost of the
intervention. Based on the figures from the Defense Budget project,
Michael O Hanlon
estimates the cost for such a humanitarian intervention
“might be expected in most cases
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to range from $3 billion to $8 billion [per year] per 50,000 personnel deployed.” 19 The
wide range of cost estimates reflects the difficulty in making accurate estimates for any
military operation. Terrain, weather, political climate, and even the remoteness of the
target state all affect the costs of intervention. Additionally, O' Hanlon's cost analysis
does not include the expected loss of life. While accidents occur in any mission, casualty
figures for an intervention can vary widely depending on the type of mission, resistance
faced, etc. Although the costs in both material and lives may be high, these interventions
are intended to save lives. The problem becomes one of“How much is too much?”
What price do we put on human life? Money alone cannot be the deciding factor. An $8
million intervention is small when compared to what some states pay for defense. For
example, the 1999 appropriation for U.S. Defense spending is $278.8 billion.
20 The real
issue in any intervention becomes the cost of human life. However, the tenet of
proportionality ensures that the international community intervenes only when the gains
in lives saved would outweigh the costs of material and lives; and alternatively, would
not intervene when those costs and loss of life were too high.
Wars must also have a reasonable chance of success to be considered just, and so
must interventions. Those who oppose intervention soon forget that there have been
several successful interventions in the last thirty years. Examples include the Indian
intervention into what was then East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971, the Tanzanian
intervention to stop the depredations of Idi Amin in Uganda in 1978-1979, the
Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea in 1978-1979, Operation Provide Comfort
in Iraq
from 1991 on, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992-1993 (prior to
the policy
change to pursue Aidid), and Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in
1994.
21 Several
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common factors contributed to the success of these interventions. Like any successful
business plan or operation, an intervention must be well planned, well organized, and
well executed. The social and political environment at the location of the planned
intervention must be analyzed and understood before the decision to intervene. In
addition, contributing states must make available sufficient resources (personnel,
material, transportation, and security measures) at the time of intervention. Lastly, “a
success objective” (humanitarian end) for the intervention must be defined, so that all
participants work toward the same objective.
In addition to satisfying the aforementioned conditions, a just war and a just
intervention must be publicly declared. Satisfying the public declared tenet for
intervention is a simple process. Publicly declaring an intervention could merely be a
matter of passing a Security Council Resolution (SCR). Some past examples include the
passage of SCR 688 for Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq. SCR 792 for
intervention in Somalia, and SCR 867 in operations in Haiti. Specifying that all justified
interventions must be publicly declared also eliminates questionable justification for the
“covert” interventions in Africa. Southeast Asia, and Latin America that were so
prevalent during the Cold War.
According to the fifth condition for a just war, only a legitimate authority can
declare war. This condition exists to prevent individuals or small groups
that do not
represent the state from legally conducting war. However, finding the
legitimate
authority for intervention in the international arena can sometimes
become complicated.
No state should have the legitimate authority to intervene in another, for
the simple
reason that there would be no system of checks and balances.
Intervention between states
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could lead to an unstable pattern of counter-intervention. Unchecked, this could mitigate
the humanitarian intents of the original intervention. It is a collective international
consensus that helps differentiate between intervention and war.
Fortunately, there is a forum for international consensus. The United Nations
provides an example of legitimate authority. Each recognized state is a member of the
United Nations and each member can voice an opinion and vote on UN Resolutions. The
Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are also examples of legitimate authorities which may
conduct limited interventions in their areas of influence. (However, I think that these
regional authorities should defer to the UN for final authority to intervene. Should the
UN decide to intervene, it has the option of assigning responsibility for the intervention
to one of these regional authorities. Thus, for example, the OSCE monitors the Serbian
troop withdrawal from Kosovo and reports the progress to the UN.) As the international
legitimate authority, the UN can decide when to intervene. However, some states do not
recognize the authority of the UN. I will discuss this problem later.
The last condition a state must satisfy to justify war is that the war be started as a
last resort. Similarly, an international intervention should be a last resort. For example,
when the public called for the end of the fighting war in T ugoslavia. Security Council
Resolutions were ignored, and diplomatic talks stagnated. Interventions such as the
NATO air strikes in the former Yugoslavia were justified to satisfy the tenet of last resort.
However, not every case of intervention involves a government that is derelict or
criminal. In Somalia, there was no government. Sometimes, the amount of
human
suffering satisfies the tenet of last resort for intervention. However,
there could be
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problems determining when the tenet of last resort is fulfilled, especially when one bases
the decision to intervene upon some threshold of human suffering (e.g. numbers of
murders or the degree of starvation.) When should the international community
intervene?
Perhaps even waiting until the last resort could reduce the effectiveness of the
intervention. Williamson suggests that, “the best time to intervene militarily is early, not
for example after sanctions have been tried for considerable time and then adjudged to
have failed.”22 However, the last resort for intervention need not be das letzte Mittel (in
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terms of time) but rather it should be the das aeusserste Mittel (in terms of seriousness).
Thus, we should intervene only when the last resort is “most serious.” However, this
version of serious-based decision making poses problems of its own. Consider the
genocide in Rwanda. Recall that the best estimates of the murders committed in Rwanda
were between 500,000 and 1 million.
24
Should the intervention have occurred when the
casualties numbered in the hundreds of thousands? Common sense would dictate when it
is time to intervene. How about when the casualties only reach 10.000? Intervention
would seem a reasonable response. The decision to intervene, however, becomes harder
in cases where the numbers of casualties, refugees, or cases of starvation are smaller.
One possible way to mitigate this problem of determining when last resort is satisfied is
by concurrently looking at the tenet of proportionality. When the expected gains are
proportionate to the expected losses, it is time to intervene.
If we modify the existing tenets of the Just War Tradition, we are able
to derive
the necessary conditions ofjust intervention. The intervention
must have a just cause; it
must be proportional; the intervention needs to have a
reasonable chance of success; and
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the international community must declare to the target state the intent to intervene.
Further, the United Nations can function as the legitimate authority for international
interventions. Whether considered as time dependent or seriousness dependent, we can
intervene only as a last resort. The Just War Tradition tenets provide a workable
framework for determining the legitimacy and justification for intervention.
A Question of Legitimacy and Just Cause
Although the Just War Tradition seems perfectly suited for justifying
intervention, it has not been universally adopted as the framework for determining when
to intervene. Some feel that simply modifying the Just War Tradition is not sufficient.
They feel that “when forcible intervention is brought under the framework principles,
traditional just war criteria have to be significantly adapted."”' Others may have
objections to some of the tenets of the Just War Tradition themselves. As I suggested
earlier, using the tenets of bellumjustum as the framework for justifying intervention is
not unopposed. These objections stem from the fact that the Just War Tradition has some
inherently ambiguous components in several of its necessary conditions. Two areas that
are subject to differing interpretation are the tenet ofjust cause and the question of
legitimate authority. Theses are related tenets because only the legitimate authority can
decide when the cause of intervention is just.
Who determines just cause? In order to legitimize the decision to intervene, the
decision must be made by an acceptable authority and “the best authority is international,
multilateral - the UN is the obvious example ."”
6 The United Nations is the closest
international equivalent of a state's legitimate government. However,
many states have
selectively ignored the authority of the UN and some have publicly denied its authority.
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One of the problems with the legitimacy ofUN authority is that the decision to intervene,
aid. or initiate trade sanctions is held by the Security Council. The Security Council's
power to intervene poses two problems. First, there may not be a consensus for
intervention, or worse, there may be opposing votes as to whom the intervention will
benefit. For example, in the Gulf Crisis, the Security Council demanded the return of
Kuwait to a pre-invasion state. 2 However, under other but similar circumstances the
Security Council might have acted differently. O'Brien tries to explain this potential
problem. He writes:
Even though an enforcement action was carried out by the United States
and other members of the UN coalition against Iraq, the status ofUN war-
decision law may not be fundamentally or permanently changed. . .. One
can think of other possible conflicts, e.g., between India and Pakistan,
where Security Council members and other members might support
different belligerents. Their vetoes and other votes might block Security
• • 28
Council action.
Could the Security Council vote some other way under the same circumstances? If so,
then the determination ofjust cause, or whether the other conditions ofjust war are met.
does not seem to lie on firm moral ground. Rather, such decisions might be swayed by
other influences, such as balance of power, economic conditions, and internal
political
concerns. Walzer concurs with this potential problem. He thinks that some
coalitions ot
states, cooperating for the sake of their own shared interests, could
steer the voting of the
Security Council away from the original proposal. Furthermore, the
Council may not
29
reach any agreement and further loss of life may occur during this
stalemate.
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Regardless of the potential problems, the UN is the best international authority
currently available to judge the validity of an intervention. Perhaps the UN, and
especially the Security Council, needs to reform their procedures, especially those
outdated ones established at the end of World War II. Unfortunately, there are no major
procedural changes anticipated in the near future. Still, it seems wise to have an
international entity such as the UN, with at least partial representation from all the states,
deciding on the issue of intervention. It is far too simple for countries to justify their own
actions from their own point of view (e.g. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Germany’s
occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia).
Consider the justification Iraq offered for their invasion of Kuwait. Iraq presented
several defenses for their invasion that could be viewed as just cause. First, there is
significant historical evidence that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait seems to have begun as a
territorial dispute. For example, Iraq had a long-standing territorial claim to Kuwait.
Long before the Gulf crisis, Kuwait was considered to be the 19
th
province of Iraq.
During the reign of the Ottoman Empire, Kuwait was ruled as a part of Iraq. However,
Britain separated Kuwait from Iraq after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War
I. Kuwait was then a protectorate of Britain until 1961 when Kuwait became an
independent nation. In the Gulf, Britain also gave the islands of Bubiyan and Warbah,
traditionally considered part of Iraq, to Kuwait.
30
This separation of the Ottoman Empire
into several countries effectively reduced Iraq s land size and number of oil fields,
thereby leaving Iraq practically land-locked. Citing these territorial claims,
Iraq has
always considered that Kuwait is part of Iraq. Saddam Hussein summarized how the
invasion solved this issue during his September 24, 1990 speech on the
Republic ot Iraq
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Radio. He said, “Kuwait is Iraqi.
. .they are a people who have returned to the fold; a land
that has been restored to the people .'01 The Iraqis viewed the invasion of Kuwait as
merely a re-establishment of the traditional Iraqi border.
Iraq also claimed self-defense as justification for their invasion. They perceived
that Kuwait had launched what amounted to an economic first strike against Iraq. In
violation of their OPEC treaty, Kuwait had cut oil prices and increased oil production
levels. Kuwait even pumped more than their negotiated share of oil from the Iraqi-
• • • • 'X'X
Kuwaiti jointly owned Rumalian oil fields. Saddam Hussein summarized that Iraq was
undergoing an economic attack by Kuwait when he stated:
Frankly, war is fought not only with soldiers.... There are other means of
conducting wars, economic means. We hope that our brethren who do not
wish open war with Iraq will realize that this economic kind of war will
not be tolerated any longer. We have come to a point beyond which we
cannot go .
34
Additionally, Iraq told the U. S. Ambassador that Kuwait was involved in territorial
encroachment on Iraqi soil.
3
' Moreover, it appears as though Kuwait was trying
horizontal drilling under the border .
36 With their historical territorial claim to Kuwait and
evidence of Kuwait’s economic warfare, Iraq felt that the invasion of Kuwait had just
cause.
The international community, especially the thirty-three members of the coalition,
of course, disagreed. The international community viewed the Iraqi aggression not only
as a violation of the Laws of Warfare, but as an “assault upon a people, their
everyday
life and their physical survival .’
07
It was the UN, exemplified by the passage of SRC
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678. that determined that Iraq's actions were wrong, not the individual state of Kuwait, or
even the U.S.
The same consideration must be applied to the decision for any intervention. In
order to justify intervention, and to have that intervention considered acceptable to the
international community, each case should be brought forward, discussed, decided upon,
and then executed at the multinational level. The UN is currently the best international
body to make a decision to intervene.
Intervention vs. Sovereignty
As we solidify the guidelines to be used to justify intervention, we must also
answer the problem of violating the sovereignty of another state. Since the Treaty of
Westphalia, individual states, international law, the international community, and even
the Catholic Church have recognized the benefits of sovereignty and have resisted
changes to the rights of sovereignty states enjoy. In 1758, de Vattel wrote, “states have
rights to legislate and administer justice without interference from outside their
borders.”
38 The protection against violations of a state’s sovereignty are further
recognized and codified in the UN Charter. In fact, the UN was founded on the
recognition that sovereignty is essential for international peace. Article 2 (1) reads that
the “Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
members.”39 Furthermore, the use of force is prohibited against “the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state,’
40
and an acceptance that nothing shall authorize
the UN “to intervene in matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any
state.”
41
In addition, the U.S. Catholic bishops wrote that, “sovereignty and
non-
intervention into the life of another state have long been sanctioned by
Catholic social
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principles....
”
4
‘ Any attempt at intervention whether humanitarian or not, would violate
a state’s sovereignty. 43
Furthermore, the problem of intervention and sovereignty has a long and
contentious history. Hobbes argued that sovereign states have no authority over other
states. Charles Fox, a member of the House of Commons in 1794, also spoke of the
common notion of sovereignty. He said:
If a people, in the formation of their government, have been ill-advised, if
they have fallen into error, if they have acted iniquitously and unjustly
toward each other, God is the only judge; it is not the province of other
nations to chastise their folly, or punish their wickedness, by choosing
who should rule over them, or in what manner and form they should be
governed.
44
Any type of intervention necessarily violates the principle of sovereignty. However, in
the intervention I am proposing, I am not trying to suggest that the principle of
sovereignty is false, nor do I think that other states’ rights should by swept aside for just
any intervention. We should intervene only in dire circumstances when the tenets of Just
Intervention are met.
The problem is one ofjustifying a limited violation of sovereignty to allow for
international intervention. One proposed argument for allowing selective violations of
sovereignty is based upon the theory that a state s right to existence, hence its right to
sovereignty, is founded upon the collective rights of its citizens. Grotius thought that
“certain rights belong to every person by virtue simply of membership ol the human race,
and that there is a universal obligation to ensure that these rights are respected.
Membership in the human race entails certain rights of self-determination. I eson has
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applied this theory to propose that interventions can be right in certain cases. He suggests
that there are two pillars of international law: one based on human rights and the other
based on state sovereignty. This dichotomy of views is often at the root of confusion
over whether intervention is just or not. Thus, Teson suggests that our notion of
international law may need modifying to include a more flexible account of sovereignty.
The creation of the state arises from the need to protect the individuals in that
state. Although we commonly think that states exist as a defense against foreign
aggression, the state also exists to protect the individuals’ rights at home.46 Furthermore,
a state that forgoes the protection of its citizens or violates their rights loses its own right
of existence or sovereignty. The Declaration of Independence is based on similar ideas.
Michael Smith writes:
[T]he justification for state sovereignty cannot rest on its own prescriptive
legitimacy. Instead, it must be derived from the individuals, whose rights
are to be protected from foreign oppression or intrusion and from their
right to a safe, sovereign framework in which they can enforce their
autonomy and preserve their interests . . . that a state that is oppressive and
violates the autonomy and integrity of its subjects forfeits its moral claim
to full sovereignty.
47
When a state violates the rights of its subjects, a rigid application of the notion of
sovereignty becomes shaky. Augustine wrote in De Civitate Dei 4.4, “Take away justice,
and what are governments but brigandage on a grand scale.” Following the Just
Intervention tenets, a legitimate authority, such as the UN, can interpret the criminal
actions of the state against its subjects, or the inaction of the target state to relieve their
subjects’ suffering, as just cause for intervention. As a matter ot tact, this notion of a
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more flexible attitude toward sovereignty in emergencies can be found in the UN Charter.
Chapter VII of the Charter concerns action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches
of the peace, and acts of aggression.48 Under Chapter VII, threats to peace and breaches
of the peace could be considered just cause for intervention.
New technology is another reason that the notion of sovereignty is becoming less
rigid. Communication makes it easier to cross borders and mediate differing ideologies.
Furthermore, states today have become less autonomous. Separate, self-interested states,
where isolationism was the ideology (e.g. the U.S. before World War I and between the
Wars), have given way to a kind of “economic interdependence.” The G7, OPEC, and
European Union are evolving from purely economic organizations into political entities.
Sovereignty is important to prevent unfettered, illegal intervention, but it should not be an
objection in severe cases of human rights abuses.
Besides the opinion that intervention can, in certain situations, violate a state's
sovereignty, there exists another, potentially worse, difficulty with intervention. If
conditions permit, there could be a problem of long-term intervention. Successful
intervention is “likely to require a much more substantial challenge to conventional
sovereignty: a long-term military presence, ... and along the way, making all this
[humanitarian relief, nation building] possible, the large scale and reiterated use of
force.”
49 Long-term intervention posses many difficult issues (not just involving
sovereignty). Logistics, military readiness, and political favor would all be stressed
by a
long-term intervention. However, the impacts of long-term intervention
should be
reviewed under the tenet of proportionality. The UN should then determine if the
intervention has a reasonable chance of success. If the proposed
intervention is
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proportional and has a reasonable chance of success, long-term intervention may not be
an insurmountable problem . 50
Jus in Bello and Intervention
Before I conclude, I want to discuss conduct during intervention. I have
presented ajus ad bellum framework for justifying intervention, but what principles can
we use to monitor the conduct of the agency’s members on the ground? Recall the two
principles ofjus in bello : discrimination and proportionality. I propose that these same
two tenets apply in interventions as they do in war. The concept of treating those who
conduct humanitarian intervention as soldiers in combat may seem strange at first. But
historically, many interventions, intended only to supply food and clean water, have been
conducted by the military or with the help of the military. Consider Operation Turquoise
in Rwanda and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Both were humanitarian relief
interventions that required multinational military forces to ensure that supplies were
distributed evenly, fairly, and to remote areas. Former UN Secretary General Dag
Hammerskold said, “peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it.
The principle of proportion states that “the harm judged likely to result from a
particular military action should not be disproportionate to the good aimed at. The
same principle applies during intervention. Forcing a convoy transporting food through
an insurgent force’s roadblock may result in more casualties than the delivery of food
would have saved. Perhaps that particular course of action, breaching the roadblock, is
not the only alternative. Negotiation, using a different route, and even the
threat of force
are better alternatives to the use of force. Although force may be sometimes
necessary,
the soldier on the ground must decide if her actions would result in a
proportionate good.
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The otherjus in hello principle, the tenet of discrimination, concerns the problem
of who can be justified as combatants and who are non-combatants. It theorizes that
"non-combatants should be immune from direct attack .” 53 Discrimination also applies in
intervention. Non-combatants have a right to life. However, in many cases the
distinction between combatants and non-combatants blurs. During the raid to capture
Aidid in Somalia, renegade Somali gunmen and U.S. solders became combatants. To
protect themselves from U.S. Forces’ fire, the Somali gunmen used women and children
as shields. In a case like this, the principle of discrimination becomes difficult to
actualize. The soldiers had to determine when to shoot and when to refrain from
shooting. In a similar way, the intervening forces in accordance with the international
authority must establish rules of engagement during intervention operations.
The principles of proportionality and discrimination are not perfect; and, as I have
shown, they are often hard to uphold. However, they are important guidelines for the
members of the agency to follow. They will help her ensure that the intent of the
intervention is fulfilled and that she does not contribute to the problems she was sent
there to resolve.
Conclusion
I have presented the Just War Tradition as a possible framework for justifying
intervention. With slight modifications, the same war tenets may be used for peaceful
intentions, such as intervention for humanitarian reasons. Foremost, an intervention must
have a just cause. I have suggested several situations were intervention is justified, such
as preventing genocide and peacekeeping. These missions would satisfy the principle of
just cause. Any losses incurred during intervention should be proportional to the gains,
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additionally, the conditions for a reasonable chance of success must be discussed and
planned prior to the decision to intervene. Finally, what constitutes last resort may not
always be measured in terms of time, because the severity of the situation may dictate the
time to intervene. To avoid the questionable intent of covert interventions, the decision
to intervene must be made public.
Only a legitimate international authority can intervene. Additionally, I have
proposed that the UN is the logical international authority. However, problems with the
UN as the legitimate authority still need to be resolved. Palestinians and others in the
Muslim world could argue as follows:
Kuwait was occupied and within six months the world assembled a
massive military force to expel Saddam Hussein. Palestinians wait 25
years and more, but receive little help in ensuring that SCR 242 is
implemented. ... For the UN to carry conviction as the “legitimate
authority” to authorize armed intervention ... it must be seen to be
impartial and consistent in the application of international law.^
4
However, the UN remains the best and, currently, only legitimate option.
By meeting the same tenets that are used to justify war, I have shown that the just
war tenets ofjus ad bellum can be used as a framework for intervention. I addressed
several potential pitfalls of applying the Just War Tradition to humanitarian intervention.
Additionally, I showed that the question of sovereignty can be “set aside" in certain cases
where human rights violations are severe. In cases where a state is criminal or negligent,
the target state has forfeited their right to sovereignty.
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While sovereignty remains a fundamental state right, the face of sovereignty is
changing with the evolving formation of an international community. Additionally, a
growing economic interdependence, as evidenced by how the G7, OPEC, and European
Union (EU) are evolving from purely economic organizations into political entities.
(Operation Allied Force is an EU-sponsored, NATO force air intervention in Kosovo and
Serbia). Sovereignty is necessary to prevent illegal intervention, but it should not be an
rigid barrier allowing severe cases of human rights abuses.
Starvation, disease, mass deportations, and ethnic cleansing are all tragic
examples of human suffering and criminal activity that cast shadow over our world today.
In most cases, these atrocities can be prevented. Furthermore. “... all states have an
interest in global stability and even in global humanity, and in the case of wealthy and
powerful states like ours, this interest is seconded by obligation.” 55 If the state in
question cannot act, or refuses to act, then international intervention may be required. To
determine when to intervene, the UN should apply the tenets of Just Intervention.
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CHAPTER 6
A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF INTERVENTION: A CONCLUSION
Among true worshipers of God those wars are looked on as peacemaking
which are waged neither from aggrandizement nor cruelty but with the
object ot securing peace, of repressing the evil and supporting the good.
- St. Thomas Aquinas. 1
In this, the last Chapter, I will summarize the path the project has taken in
justifying intervention, from finding a definition for “intervention” to presenting a moral
and legal framework for justifying intervention. As I have demonstrated, the problem of
justifying intervention is complicated and eludes a simple strait forward solution.
However, as the world strains against the disease of haters, distrust, and ethnic cleansing,
the international community has no choice but to seek and implement a solution to the
problem of intervention. As I write this, NATO warplanes are bombing Serb positions in
Kosovo as part of Operation Allied Force. The NATO attacks have prompted strong
debate on not only the question of whether this particular intervention in Kosovo is
justified, but also the question of whether any intervention is justified. A myriad of
interpretations of what constitutes intervention cause part of the difficulty deciding if an
intervention is justified. Additionally, attempting to further justify humanitarian
interventions only highlights the difficulties inherent in any intervention. Furthermore, a
humanitarian intervention has its own controversial conditions complicated by its
humanitarian nature in addition to those found in other interventions.
However, if we had a workable definition of “intervention.' the multi-faceted
intervention problem becomes clearer and a basis for international acceptance becomes
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possible. One of these facets includes a competing legal precedent for intervention that
challenges the long-held position of non-intervention.
With a clear, all-inclusive definition of “intervention” in hand, one could also
make strong moral arguments for intervention, especially when the intervention was for
humanitarian reasons. By defining humanitarian intervention as an agency interference,
upon authorization by relevant organs of the United Nations, by force or coercion, into
the affairs of a target for the sole purpose of preventing or putting a halt to a serious
violation of fundamental human rights, a deontologist could use the theory of human
rights derived from humanitarian principles and maxims to argue for intervention on
humanitarian grounds. Similarly, a consequentialist could argue for the same
intervention, but for different reasons - intervening has the best consequences (or
resulting best state of affairs).
Regardless of which moral theory one holds, justifying a humanitarian
intervention should not be a complex project. Justifying an intervention can be a simple
process of applying the tenets of bellumjustum. The following are the modified
conditions ofjust intervention: (1) The intervention must have a just cause; (2) The
intervention's potential gains must be proportional to the losses; (3) The intervention
must also have a reasonable chance of success; (4) The country (agency) must publicly
declare intervention; (5) Only a legitimate authority can declare or sanction intervention;
and (6) Countries can only intervene as a last resort.
A close examination of historical examples of intervention, has not yielded a
workable definition for what constitutes a military humanitarian intervention. Obscure
conditions for defining “intervention,” accompanied by a long legal tradition of non-
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intervention, have clouded the arguments for justified interventions. In Chapter 2,
1
sought various definitions of “intervention,” and then extracted the essential conditions
from each of these definitions. Searching both past and present literature concerning
intervention, I selected those conditions that codified historical interventions. Reducing
the research into a set of intervention conditions, I formulated a definition of
“intervention" that applied the principles of agency, target, method, and purpose. I
defined “intervention” as an agency interference, by force or coercion, into the affairs of
a target, (i) to protect the agency’s nationals, (ii) to protect interests considered vital to
the agency, (iii) to support succession, (iv) for counter-intervention, or (v) to prevent or
to put a halt to serious violations of human rights.
I then refined the definition of “intervention” to reflect the criteria commonly
considered necessary for a humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention, I
proposed, is an intervention authorized by relevant organs of the internationally
recognized authority where states are voting members for the sole purpose of preventing
or putting a halt to a serious violation of fundamental human rights; such that this
interference has (a) a humanitarian cause, (b) a declared humanitarian end, (c) a
humanitarian outcome, and (d) is conducted through humanitarian means.
With a definition of “intervention,” and the conditions that must be satisfied for
an intervention to be declared humanitarian. I identified the legal precedent for
intervention. Embedded in the Charter of the UN lies the foundation for the recognition
and protection of human rights. Furthermore, I discovered that interventions are legal
under international law when they oppose a threat to international peace and security. A
legal precedent for intervention does not presuppose the act of intervention, nor does it
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pose a direct threat to sovereignty in general and the tradition of non-intervention.
However, “governments and armies engaged in massacres are readily identified as
criminal governments and armies”' and might temporality lose their right to sovereignty.
By committing genocide or threatening the peace, these criminal states would be legally
open to intervention.
In Chapter 3, 1 sought to formulate a deontological approach to intervention. I
demonstrated that one could make a deontological argument for intervention based on
certain inalienable rights. I then analyzed the theories concerning human rights and their
generated corresponding duties by Ross, Kant, Rawls, and others. After discussing that
these duties to intervene are based upon fundamental human rights, I examined how we
get these duties to intervene. One can argue that we have a duty to intervene as a prima
facie duty or as a duty in accordance with a maxim derived under the veil of ignorance.
Regardless of howr these certain rights might generate duties, I demonstrated the
differences between duties we have from our relationships, contracts, and business
(special duty) and duties that everyone shares (general duty). In discussing this
distinction between special and general duties. I showed that the obligation generated by
a special duty does not vanish when the primary duty-bearer is unable to fulfil it - general
duties obligate everyone. I further discussed that special duties often obligate a
secondary duty-bearer. States, like individuals, have special and general duties. A state s
general duties correspond to the universal human membership. When a state fails to
fulfill its special duty, other states’ general duties override, and obligate them to complete
the unfulfilled special duty.
134
I further demonstrated that a realist argument for a principle of non-intervention
based an absence of an international community is untenable. Denying evidence of an
interdependent international community is counter-intuitive and contravenes the realists'
own theory of state self-interest. The state’s own interest in stability, credibility, and
seeking a prominent leadership role internationally will convince them to conduct
interventions. Additionally, there is little evidence to show that acknowledging and
valuing human rights is contrary to a state’s self-interest. Moreover, protecting these
rights might be in the best interests of the state. "Thus if it can be shown that ...
interventions can also be obligatory, then ‘nothing to be gained by us’ can no longer be a
valid excuse for inaction.”
3
I also explained some of the controversies with the deontological argument for
intervention. A principle of “ought implies can” does not eliminate the unpopular
conclusion that disproportionately insignificant numbers of human rights violations might
obligate the international community to intervene beyond its resources. Furthermore, the
deontologist position does not outline how we can judge the rightness of actions,
specifically interventions. Additionally, we cannot resolve which duty takes precedent
when faced with a scenario where competing duties collide.
In Chapter 4, 1 provided a consequentialist look at the problem of intervention and
sought to overcome the pitfalls of the deontologists’ argument for intervention. Not all
interventions result in acceptable consequences. However, by evaluating the
consequences of intervention, a state can determine when to intervene and when not to
intervene. Using a world theory of consequentialism, we can avoid the problems
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involving acts, various weights of consequences, and misapplication of the axiology that
plague other traditional consequentialist theories, such as utilitarianism.
Additionally, a world theory of consequentialism is useful for those who believe
that an intervention might lead to multiple insupportable interventions. Intervention in
general may at times be obligatory, but once intervention is obligated in one case, it does
not open the possibility for mass cases of intervention (some of which may be for the
wrong reasons). Each state of affairs is different. Intervention in one state does not open
the way for intervention in any state. If the state of affairs including the intervention in
question is not true at the state’s best worlds, then the state is not obligated to intervene
and should not intervene.
Continuing aid and a mandate to intervene in every conflict may pose problems
for states who judge the moral rightness of an act solely on applicable moral laws.
Intervening solely because it is the state’s duty under moral law, or intervening because it
is the duty of all of us to protect human rights, may indeed incur the problem of Haas’
slippery slope. It also might open cases of widespread, yet obligatory, intervention.
Treating the decision to intervene from a consequentialist point of view negates these
worries. Each state of affairs that involves intervention is evaluated separately from the
other states of affairs that do not involve intervention. In addition, the state of affairs that
involves intervention alone will be different from a state of affairs that includes
intervention and mediating a peace settlement. Treating the question of intervention
through consequentialism allows states to intervene and stop atrocities within their
political and logistical constraints.
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In Chapter 5, 1 presented the Just War Tradition as a possible framework for
justifying intervention. With slight modifications, the same war tenets may be used as
just intervention tenets. Foremost, an intervention must have a just cause and I suggested
several situations, such as preventing genocide and ethnic cleansing as well as
peacemaking, as examples ofjust cause for intervention. Additionally, for a justified
intervention, any losses incurred during intervention should be proportional to the gains.
What constitutes a reasonable chance of success must be discussed and planned before
the actual intervention. An intervention must also be the last resort, only initiated when
diplomacy fails. However, last resort may not always be measured in terms of time. The
severity of the situation may dictate the time to intervene. Additionally, to avoid the
problem of questionable intent of covert interventions, the agency must make a public
declaration of their intended intervention.
Finally, only a legitimate international authority can authorize intervention. I
proposed that the UN is the only legitimate international authority. However, several
problems involving UN authority need to be resolved. Historically, humanitarian crisis
and threats to peace have received disproportionate amounts ofUN interest and resolve.
“For the UN to carry conviction as the ‘legitimate authority’ to authorize armed
intervention ... it must be seen to be impartial and consistent in the application of
international law.”
4
However, in spite of its difficulties, the UN remains the only
legitimate option for a truly international authority.
As to the question of the right of sovereignty, “[Sovereignty is and remains a
legal and moral norm of protection against outside interference and domination, set up in
reaction against the medieval system of overlapping jurisdiction and dispersed
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possessions.” 5 Nevertheless, I showed that the right to sovereignty can be “set aside” in
certain cases of severe human rights violations. In cases where a state is criminal or
negligent, the target state forfeits their strict right to sovereignty.
Growing international communication technology makes trade across borders and
integrating differing practices and ideologies easier. Furthermore, today, states are
becoming less autonomous. Separate, self-interested states, where isolationism was the
ideology, have given way to a kind of informal international community based on an
increasing “economic interdependence.” International organizations, formed around
economic issues (e.g. the G7, OPEC, and European Union (EU)), are evolving into
political entities and assuming international political roles. Sovereignty is important to
prevent unfettered, illegal intervention, but it should not be an objection in severe cases
of human rights abuses. UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar said in 1991, “the
principle of non-interference with the essential domestic jurisdiction of states cannot be
regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively and
systematically violated with impunity.”
6
Starvation, disease, mass deportations, and ethnic cleansing are all tragic
examples of human suffering and often result from state-sponsored criminal activity.
Furthermore, “all states have an interest in global stability and even in global humanity,
and in the case of wealthy and powerful states like ours, this interest is seconded by
obligation.”
7
If the target state in question cannot act, or refuses to act, then international
intervention may be required. Applying the tenets of Just Intervention can determine it
the intervention is justified.
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In this project, I set out to establish a workable definition of “intervention" and
the conditions for humanitarian intervention. I wanted to show a legal precedent for
intervention as well as moral arguments for intervention from deontologists and
consequentialist points of view. Then I modified the bellum justum conditions to fit the
question of intervention. Have we answered the question ofjustified intervention? It
seems as though we have. The conditions ofjust intervention specify that the
intervention must have a just cause, proportionality, and a reasonable chance of success.
Furthermore, the country (agency) must publicly declare intervention. Only the
legitimate authority can declare or sanction intervention; and the agency can only
intervene as a last resort when diplomacy fails.
Nevertheless, justifying an intervention entails no guarantee that all parties will
condone the intervention. Parties outside the target will often disapprove of the
intervention, even if a adequate case for intervention is brought against the target. The
current crisis in Yugoslavia is a good example. The Security Council representative from
the Russian Federation, Sergey Lavrov, opposed the intervention in Kosovo (Operation
Allied Force) as “a unilateral use of force and a blatant violation of the United Nations
Charter.”
8
Lavrov voiced his fears that a dissolving principle of non-intervention,
demonstrated by a UN acceptance of the NATO air strikes in Yugoslavia, could lead to
widespread intervention abuse. He warned that “the virus of a unilateral approach could
spread .”
9
The Russian representative raises a valid concern. As I demonstrated, however,
one intervention does not necessarily lead to other interventions. In some circumstances,
intervention is inevitable and to delay action increases the risks and the costs to the
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agency. Furthermore, delaying the use of force often increases the chances for continued
depredations in the target. Sir David Hannay, former Great Britain ambassador to the UN
said, “the cost of remedying a situation once it gets out of control is indefinitely greater
than the cost of ... international efforts to head off such disasters before they occur.” 10
The other issue Lavrov raises is that the NATO air strikes occurred without the
consent of the UN Security Council. 1
1
His assertion is primafacie correct; there was no
specific Security Council resolution mandating air strikes in Kosovo. However. NATO
has legal support for intervention from Security Council Resolutions 1203 and, in
particular, 1199. SCR 1199, “demanded that Serbian forces take immediate steps to
improve the humanitarian situation [in Kosovo] and avert the impending humanitarian
catastrophe.” Furthermore, Serbia violated the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) brokered cease-fire that they signed on October 25, 1998.
Voting against the Russian proposed UN condemnation of the NATO intervention, the
Slovenian delegate said that although the Security Council has a primary responsibility
for international peace and security, it is not an exclusive responsibility.
13
“In the face of
human disaster, however, internationalism has a more urgent meaning. It is not possible
to wait; anyone who can take the initiative should do so. Active opposition to massacre
and massive deportation is morally necessary; its risks must be accepted.”
14
Although the
UN delegates disagreed to the justification of the NATO intervention, this example
reinforces the need for an international forum and specified legitimate authority for
intervention.
When international atrocities are severe and the cost of ending the conflict
outweighs the potential losses, there appears to be little strength in arguing for
non-
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intervention. Nevertheless, there remains one formable barrier to humanitarian
intervention. ‘ The most difficult problems that now confront us are those not so much
ethical or even military as political. Even if we accept that there is a duty to intervene,
how do we in democracies, generate the will to do so?” 15
Yes, the norm is not to intervene in other peoples' countries; the norm is
self-determination. But not for these people, the victims of tyranny,
ideological zeal ethnic hatred, who are not determining anything for
themselves, who urgently need help from the outside. And it isn’t enough
to wait until the tyrants, the zealots, and the bigots have done their filthy
work and then rush food and medicines to the ragged survivors.
Whenever the filthy work can be stopped, it should be stopped. And if not
by us, the supposedly decent people of this world, then by whom? 16
The definition for “intervention” and conditions for a just intervention themselves
will not end the human suffering and depredations. We as members of the international
community must act. First, we must acknowledge that individuals have certain rights.
Then, only when we recognize that massive violations of these human rights constitute a
threat to international peace, will we unilaterally condone interventions to stop the
atrocities. Promulgation of the conditions ofjust interventions will lead to the
international community’s recognition that widespread indiscriminate killing is
unacceptable and must be stopped. Perhaps committing our forces now to stop these
depredations will prevent us from having to commit them later to repair a shattered
peace.
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